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The dilemma of how to deal with and respond to humanitarian disasters and large-scale human 
rights abuses has become more and more the forefront of political and academic debate over 
the last few decades. The fact is nowadays, due to globalisation, there is no longer such a thing 
as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring 'in a faraway country of which we know little of. As 
a result, the question of whether or not the international community should still obey the 
principle of non-intervention, thus allowing the use of sovereignty as an excuse or whether 
time has come to turn a new leaf to the idea and concept of sovereignty. The concept of 
'Responsibility to Protect' is an international norm and has been subject to much debate 
recently amongst policy makers and academics alike. The international community is acutely 
aware of the consequences of not having an accepted norm of intervention. While many accept 
that the UN Security Council's powers to intervene in matters involving horrendous human 
rights violations are limited, few are willing to recommend an expansion of these powers, 
predominantly because such a proposition will almost certainly be countered by reference to 
the inviolability of state sovereignty. State sovereignty has for too long played a starring role 
in the demise of many attempts to legitimise intervention. The thesis seeks to eliminate this 
convenience with which the concept of sovereignty is used as an affective legal and political 
justification for non-intervention by States and regional organisations, and rather turn to look 
at a new perspective with which the continuing evolution of the responsibility to protect can in 
fact keep territorial integrity and protect the true sovereignty, as well as provide a reminder to 
States that they cannot and must not be "innocent and impotent bystanders" of humanitarian 
disasters and war crimes in foreign countries, furthering that the responsibility to protect, if 
properly understood, implemented and enforced, provides both conceptual and practical 
avenues that could help fill the asymmetry between the magnitude of threats to human security 
and our ability to face them. 
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1 ~h!!l!ier 1: Introduction to Research 
l.l Introduction 
One of the mam controversies plaguing the international community over the last three 
decades, is the approach in civilian protection in non-international armed conflicts. The UN 
Chatter provides that, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state", 1 giving us the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. However this principle 
does not rule out the application of enforcement measures, in case of a threat to peace, a breach 
of peace, or acts of aggression on the part of the state.2 The Genocide Convention also, 
overrules the non-intervention principle, in order to lay down the commitment of the world to 
prevent and punish those who commit the crime of genocide, violating the right to life. 3 Yet 
the inaction in response to the Rwandan genocide and failure to stop the Srebrenica massacre 
in Bosnia highlights the complexity of international law to respond to crimes against humanity. 
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, remembering the failures in the 1990's, put 
forward a challenge to Member States: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to 
gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity?"4 
In 2000, the Canadian govermnent and several other actors announced the establishment of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty5 to address the task the 
international community had for the responsibility to act in the face of the severest of human 
rights violations while respecting the sovereignty of the states. It sought to bridge these two 
1 Article 2 (7), Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, I UNTS XVI. 
2 Chapter VII , Charter of the United Nations. 
3 Article I & 8, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78. 
4 We the peoples: role of the United Nations in the 2 1" centwy, Millennium Report of the Secretary General, 
2000, UN Doc A/54/00 . 
5 ICISS . 
concepts with the Responsibility to Protect6 report. 7 When the doctrine for R2P was 
incorporated into the lJN, it was included as every state has the responsibility to protect its 
citizens from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity." If a state 
fails to do so, it then becomes the responsibility of the international community to protect that 
state's population. 8 
At present, the international community has limited options for responding to humanitarian 
crises, as "the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of States must be fully 
respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" ,9 which makes it difficult to 
operate in situations where the affected state denies access. 
As we step into the 18111 year after the beginning of millennia, this problem still seems to persist, 
allowing the creation crisis situations such as those in Syria and Yemen, through conflict as 
well as Nepal, West Africa and Somalia, where natural disasters such as earth quakes, diseases 
like Ebola and droughts have created a greater need for help and assistance. 
This dissertation explores when it is a requirement for the UN to fulfil its responsibility to 
protect, making it a justifiable cause. Tlu·ough an examination of various missions under the 
R2P doctrine, including Libya, Afghanistan and Burundi, with a focus on two of these 
missions, which determine the true nature of interventions, under the R2P, in practicality and 
the legal process to proceed in theory, as well as the true nature of the doctrine of sovereignty, 
and when it can be established to be breached. 
6 R2P. 
7 The Responsibility to Protect Report, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
2001 . 
8 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, UN A/ RES/60/1 
(24 October 2005). 
9 UNGA, Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations, UN 
A/RES/46/ 182 (22 December 1992). 
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1.2 Background information 
Following the tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international community 
began to seriously debate how to react efficiently when the human rights of many are blatantly 
violated. The controversy between States having absolute sovereignty over their affairs and the 
international community having the right to intervene in a country for humanitarian purposes. 10 
The report by ICISS 11 found that sovereignty not only gave a State the right to "control" its 
affairs, it also discussed on the State primary "responsibility" for protecting the people within 
its territory. It suggested that when a State fails to protect its people- either through lack of 
ability or a lack of willingness - the responsibility should shift to the international 
community. 12 
The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a panel set up by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recommended the emerging doctrine of R2P, in 2004, 
upholding that there is a collective international responsibility that is needed, which is, 
"exercisable by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, in the 
event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing and serious violations of 
humanitarian law which sovereign govermnents have proved powerless or unwilling to 
prevent." The panel put forth a basic criteria that would help legitimise the authorisation of the 
use of force, which included the seriousness of the threat, that it must be a last resort, and that 
the proportionality ofthe response must be adequate.13 
Further in 2005, the UN member states in a World Summit, accepted the responsibility of each 
State to protect its population from the crimes stated above, formally. World leaders also agreed 
that when a State fails to meet that responsibility, they as the "international community" are 
responsible for helping to protect the people. They also noted that should peaceful means -
including diplomatic or humanitarian, be inadequate and national authorities "manifestly fail" 
to protect their civilians, they should act collectively in a "timely and decisive manner", through 
10 UNGA, .United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN A/RES/55/2 (18 September 2000) . 
11 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
12 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
13 A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, 2004, UN Doc A/59/565 . 
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the UN Security Council and in accordance with the UN Charter, on a case-by-case basis and 
in cooperation with regional organisations as appropriate. 14 
The first time the Security Council made official reference to the R2P was in April 2006, in its 
resolution 15 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Security Council referred to 
that resolution in August 2006, when passing another resolution 16 authorising the deployment 
of UN peacekeeping troops to Darfur, Sudan. 
Furthermore, following widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by 
the regime in Libya, the UN Security Council, unanimously adopted a resolution 17 , making 
explicit reference to the R2P. Deploring what it called "the gross and systematic violation of 
human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence, 
"recalling the Libyan authorities ' responsibility to protect its population," and imposed a series 
of international sanctions. 
This lead to another response to the escalating, post-election violence against the population of 
Cote d'Ivoire in late 2010 and early 2011, by the UN Security Council, on 30 March 2011, 
adopting a resolution 18 condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters 
of both former President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. The resolution cited "the 
primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians," called for the immediate transfer of 
power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffirmed that the UN Operation 
in Cote d'lvoire (UNOCI) could use "all necessary means to protect life and propet1y." 
Recently, the R2P has featured prominently in many resolutions by the Security Council. 
Primarily in the Syrian crisis, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has stressed the 
urgent need for a political solution to end the crisis, which over the past tlu·ee years has claimed 
more than 100,000 lives. In his rep011 on early warning, assessment and the R2P, he identifies 
gaps and proposes ways to improve the UN's ability to use early warnings more effectively, 
including information from field operations, and improve early, flexible and composed 
responses where there is risk of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or etlmic 
14 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. 
15 UNSC S/RES/1674 (2006) the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. 
16 UNSC S/RES/1706 (2006) the Situation in South Sudan . 
17 UNSC S/RES/1970 (2011) the Situation in Libya. 
18 UNSC S/RES/1975 (2011) the Situation in Cote d'lvoire . 
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cleansing. 19 This report emphasised the need for "global-regional collaboration" to help 
implement the R2P, as well as recognising gaps and suggested ways for the UN to strengthen 
its cooperation. 
The Secretary-General's fourth report on the R2P, presented in September 2012, examined the 
idea of a "timely and decisive response" when a State failed to protect its people, including the 
variety of options and associates available, especially looking at the close connection between 
prevention and response.20 
1.2.1 Statement of problem: 
In the current times, a need for a quick and efficient response of internal crisis, be it natural or 
man-made conflict, is not only demanded but a necessity. There is a need, where all else fails, 
for humanity and the task to save lives to conquer all. 
1.2.2 Justification of study 
It seems that although Kofi Annan brought this problem to light almost 17 years ago, we still 
have no solution, that we allow to come close to solving the problem raised, yet the crisis keep 
growing out of proportion, endangering more lives and increasing the death toll, while we are 
left hearing 'never again' from the pinnacle of world peace, feeling as helpless as we did during 
the Rwandan and Srebrenica genocide. 
The solution the General Assembly of the UN opted for was the emergence of R2P, however 
it still did not answer the age old question, of how the world can help without the impeachment 
of sovereignty. The General Assembly did not allow for the actors of R2P, to fully function as 
it should, limiting its rights in the 2009 resolution, to up keep sovereignty, yet in the same 
resolution's debate, it was seen that with sovereignty came with the responsibility to protect 
citizens from mass atrocities and that the doctrine of R2P, thus aims to enhance sovereignty, 
and not to undermine it. 
In August 2016, the former Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, released his eighth and final 
report on R2P, entitled Mobilising Collective Action: The Next Decade of the R2P. The report 
19 Ki-Moon B, United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, Early warning, assessment and the responsibility 
to protect, 20 I 0, UN Doc A/64/864. 
2° Ki-Moon B, United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and decisive 
response, 2012, UN Doc A/66/874-S/2012/578. 
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reflects on both the successes and failures ofthe R2P and, in doing so, focuses on the current 
barriers to mobilising collective action, offering suggestions on how we might overcome these 
barriers in the future. The report also stresses the need to work collectively to ensure the 
protection of civilians from atrocities, especially by placing emphasis on the primacy of 
prevention. 
With a need to assess the definition of sovereignty, and its holding in a crisis, be it a man-made 
conflict or a natural disaster, further defining where it lies during an act of war, it is imperative 
that the solution to protect humanity and human lives, i.e. R2P is fully understood as well as 
how it best applied, and at what cost and criteria. 
This dissertation focuses on the doctrine of sovereignty and its application in international law, 
the concept of R2P and its current usage in the world, and how the gap between sovereignty 
and R2P can be bridged, with a substantial look at the true application of the R2P doctrine and 
how it can be truly efficient in this day and age. 
1.3 Statement of objective 
1.3.1 Main objective: 
To find an efficient solution to the preservation of human lives during natural disasters, internal 
and external conflict, without the impeaclm1ent of legal rights and obligations. 
1.3.2 Specific objectives: 
1. To expound on the definition of sovereignty, and its application in modern day. 
2. To advance the doctrine ofR2P, as a better alternative to the humanitarian intervention 
used prior. 
3. To advocate for the allowance of the gap between sovereignty and the original 
application of R2P to be bridged in order to have a better preventive and responsive 
resolution for a safer and peaceful world. 
6 
1.4 Research question 
1) What is the true definition of sovereignty, through history and when does it be apply in 
modern day? 
2) What is the doctrine of R2P and how can we apply it efficiently, hence making it a 
better alternative to humanitarian intervention? 
3) How can the gap between sovereignty and R2P be bridged, allowing for better working 
ofthe original concept? 
1.5 Literature Review 
l. 5.1 Theme 1 : Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is assumed in jurisprudence as the absolute right and power of a governing body 
to administer itself without any interference from outside sources or bodies.21 When looked at 
the French word souverainete, its attainment and retention, in both Chinese and Western 
culture22, has traditionally been associated with certain moral imperatives upon any claimant. 
During the 1990s, there was a clear exception to 'traditional sovereignty' which was the 
'sovereignty as responsibility' introduced by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen in 1996.23 
According to Dan Philpott24 , Sovereignty has a core meaning of supreme authority within a 
territory. Even though history shows a variety of definitions, it has been come to be understood 
as a modern notion of political authority. Although historical variants may be understood along 
tlu·ee elements- the holder of sovereignty, the absoluteness of sovereignty, and the internal 
and external dimensions of sovereignty, in that the State is the political institution in which 
sovereignty is embodied, and that an accumulation of states forms a sovereign states system. 
There are vastly differing views on the moral basis of sovereignty, fundamentally being 
21 'Sovereignty I Politics' Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/sovereigntv on 12 
January 2017. 
22 Bateman CG, 'Nicaea and Sovereignty: Constantine's Council of Nicaea as an Important Crossroad in the 
Development of European State Sovereignty' University of British Columbia (20 I I) 54-91. 
23 Cohen Rand Deng F, Masses in Flight: the Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, Brookings Institution Press, 
2012 . 
24 'Daniel Philpott, 'Sovereignty" Plato.stanford. edu, 20 !7 https:i/plato.stanford .edu/entrie/sovereigntv/ on 12 
January 2017. 
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between theories that assert that sovereignty is vested directly in the sovereign by divine or 
natural right and theories that assert it originates from the people. 
Matteo Laruffa noted that "sovereignty resides in every public action and policy as the exercise 
of executive powers by institutions open to the participation of citizens to the decision-making 
processes"25 
Based on the history and current views of sovereignty, it is imperative to note where 
sovereignty iies and what it stands for, through the dissertation, a focus on the affirmation and 
ideology of ' sovereignty as responsibility' rather than the traditional definition, of sovereignty 
being the supreme power of the sovereign , which will prove to be an asset in the furthering of 
the objective to find a solution to the controversy between protection of human rights through 
intervention and the principle of non-interference. 
1.5.2 Theme 2: Responsibility to Protect 
The principle of the R2P is based on the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a 
responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations. 
The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially 
the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and 
armed conflict. 
The R2P provides a framework for engaging measures that already exist (i .e., mediation, early 
warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers of the Security Council) to 
prevent crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use 
of force under the framework of the R2P, rests solely with UN Security Council and is 
considered a measure of last resort. The UN Secretary-General has published annual reports on 
the R2P since 2009 that expand on the measures available to governments, intergovernmental 
organisations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity crimes. 
According to Ramesh Thakur, International humanitarian law is about protecting people. The 
UN originated to create and enforce international law which it did with some triumph. The 
largest being the prevention of World War III till now. Nevei1heless, there were many conflicts 
25 Matteo L, 'The European Integration and National Interests: fi·om an intergovernmental model to a 
Constitutional Agreement', Hungarian Academy of Social Sciences (20 14 ). 
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after World War II, with the increasing number until the early 1990s, where we saw a decline 
and a suddenjump in the late 2000's and 2010's.26 
Mary O'Connell stated 'What we need more than R2P in the sense just mentioned is R2P 
understood as Responsibility to Peace. Peace is the greatest human right, upon which all others 
depend, and it is being challenged by a new militarism. '27 With the concept of ideas matter, the 
idea of implementing peace is quite young. That non-violence should rule in international 
affairs is something philosophers always envisioned. But only in the last two centuries did 
political leaders begin to think in those terms. The disaster of World War II shocked the world 
into forming the UN and the use of force in international relations was proclaimed illegal with 
the only two exceptions: self-defence and when authorised by the Security Council. 
In keeping with this line, Edward Luck raises a good point, that the doctrine of R2P, is in fact 
still quite young and determining its future would be reckless as we cannot possibly decide 
whether it is efficient or not, if we do not allow it to function as it should. The positive talks by 
UN member states on the application of R2P shows conceptual and political progress, which 
further shows that they understand the difference between principle and tactics used to 
implement the doctrine.28 
Anne-Marie Slaughter from Princeton University has called it " ... the most important shift in 
our conception of sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. "29 
Susan Breau looked at R2P, as a radical and controversial new approach in international 
relations and international law, which provides a way out of the conflict between R2P and 
sovereignty. 30 
26 Thakur RC, the Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws, and the Use of Force in International Politics, 
Routledge, New York, 2006. 
27 O'Connell ME, 'Responsibility to Peace: A Critique of R2P', 4 Journal of Intervention and State-building, 
(2017) 39. 
28 Luck EC, ' the Responsibility to Protect: the First Decade ' 3 Global Responsibility to Protect 4 (20 II) 387-399. 
29 ' Ethics matter: A Conversation with Anne-Marie Slaughter', Policyinnovations.org, 2017 
http:i!www.polin innovations.or~/idea~/audio.!datn!00063 1 on 5 February 2017. 
30 Breau S, 'The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping' vol I I Journal of Conflict & Security 
Law (2007) 429 . 
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Advocates of R2P claim that the only occasiOns where the international c01mmmity will 
intervene in a state without its consent is when the state has abdicated its responsibilities as a 
sovereign jurisdiction by allovving mass atrocities to occur, or is committing them. 
Interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, though not primarily humanitarian, eroded public 
support for military action. Some Syrians who oppose President Bashar al-Assad's regime, 
remember Iraq and argue that the one thing worse than a cruel dictator is a sectarian civil war. 
From the review above, it can noted that R2P is a fairly new principle that still requires a lot of 
work and adjustment in order for it to truly be established as a successful method of prevention 
and protection. With a look at the application of R2P, through missions that have been 
completed, it is notably one of the better solutions in theory and yet it seemingly fails in 
practice. It is on this disc01mect that the dissertation shall proceed in order to find the 
appropriate panacea that may help bridge the gap in international and human rights law. 
1.6 Theoretical :Framework 
In looking at the theories that relate to sovereignty and the law, as well as the aspect of what 
sovereignty amounts to we can see that; 
There is a separation in ideologies between those that claim that the people transfer their 
sovereignty to the sovereign (Hobbes)31 , and those that claim that the people keep their 
sovereignty (Rousseau)32 
Classical liberal theorists such as Stuart Mill33 believe every individual as sovereign on oneself, 
which advocates for civil and political rights, giving individuals the freedom to 'control' 
themselves as well as providing the autonomy to decide on the help and aid they require when 
in a crisis, advancing a democratic front under the law. 
Realists are ofthe opinion that sovereignty is being untouchable and is guaranteed to legitimate 
states34 . Irrespective of the definition used, realism theories revolve around four key concepts: 
1) That states are the dominant actors in international politics rather than individuals 
or international organisations, 
3 1 Hobbes T, Leviathan part 2: Commonwealth, 1651 , Chapter 18 . 
32 Rousseau JJ, the Social Contract (Book 2), 1762. 
33 Mill JS, On Liberty, 1859. 
34 Goodin RE, the Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 20 I 0. 
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2) That the international political system is anarchic as there 1s no international 
authority that can enforce rules over the states, 
3) That the actors in the international political system are rational as their actions 
maximise their own self-interest, and 
4) That all states desire power so that they can ensure their own self-preservation. 
Rationalists also see sovereignty similarly. However, rationalism affirms that the sovereignty 
of a state may be violated in extreme situations, such as violations of human rights.35 
Internationalists believe that sovereignty is obsolete and a needless hindrance to gaining peace, 
which in line with 'global community', believing that sovereignty in respect to the foundation 
of the UN charter is in fact an obstacle to humanitarian intervention.36 
Anarchists reject the sovereignty of states, often arguing for an individual kind of sovereignty, 
such as the Anarch as a sovereign person. Salvador Dali, spoke about "anarcho-monarchist", 
Antonin Artaud of the crowned anarchist, even Max Stirner talked of The Ego and Its Own. 
The unified consciousness is sovereignty over one's own body, as Nietzsche demonstrated, 
which is similar to the classical concept37 
Imperialists believe sovereignty is where power justly exists, i.e . with those states that hold the 
utmost capability to enforce the will of said State, by force or threat of force, over the public 
or other states with weaker military or political will. They effectively deny the sovereignty of 
the individual in deference to either the 'good' of the whole, or to divine right. 38 
For this dissertation, I plan to adopt a mix of a realist and an internationalists as well as that of 
rationalists theories, in seeing that the law derives from social interest and public policy and 
not just abstract rules, that the law ties a form of leadership into the rationality and legitimacy 
35 Beiser FC, the Sovereignty of Reason, the Defence of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment, Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey, 1996. 
36 Franceschet A, ' Sovereignty and Freedom: Immanuel Kant's Liberal Internationalist 'Legacy", 27 Review of 
International Studies 2 (200 I) 209-228 . 
37 Mcconkey M, ' Anarchy, Sovereignty, and the State of Exception : Schmitt ' s Challenge ' 17 The Independent 
Review 3 (20 13) 415 -428. 
38 Anghie A, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004 . 
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of actions taken in order for the greater good and finally the concept of international customary 
law being binding although not codified. 
1. 7 Hypothesis 
The Intervention, when done through a set criteria, is not only justified but necessary for the 
protection of humanity in the world, especially during an emergency situation. 
1.8 Assumptions 
During the process and proposition of this dissertation the following assumptions would be 
undertaken; 
1) Sovereignty is an absolute right to each state, in that nothing can overpower it. 
2) Responsibly to protect is a not undermining sovereignty but empowering it. 
3) R2P is a better method of humanitarian intervention 
4) The reason R2P cannot work is the overwhelming politics behind the Security Council 
and the General assembly of the UN, which does not allow it to be adapted fully. 
1.9 Research design and methodology 
In researching this dissertation, the most beneficial design and method was qualitative. 
Qualitative methods are probably the oldest of all scientific teclmiques. They are pmiicularly 
useful when a theme or topic is too complicated to be answered by a simple yes or no 
hypothesis. 
Another form was descriptive and explanatory research, allowing to answer the question of 
what is happening and why is it happening. A good description was essential to the research 
and added vastly to the understanding of nature of our society. Explanatory was used to 
describe the why, fundamentally finding the cause and giving a solution. 
Methodology specifically used: 
• Desktop research: this entailed the use of the internet to collect data, especially on the 
various missions taken place, through multiple journals, articles and websites related to 
the doctrines in question. 
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" Library resources: use of scholar texts, such as text books, journals, and academic 
material available in the Strathmore University Library39 to further develop the 
dissertation and expound on the literature review. 
1.10 Limitations 
While working on this dissertation, the greatest limitation was that, all the information that was relied 
on was secondary, hence had the possibility of biased towards one side. Primary information was 
difficult to come by as the authors were not present to witness any of the crisis ' taking place. 
Interviewing people involved was also difficult, as the idea is still settling in in the international realm 
and does not have consistency so most have a variety of views as to what can be done. It was also 
difficult in obtaining information, as the entire disse1tation was researched online and through the 
opinion ofvarious academic authors. 
1.11 Chapter breakdown 
The final dissertation will consist of 5 main chapters. A chapter per research question: 
1) Introduction: 
The first chapter of the Dissertation served to introduce the problem and the purpose of the 
study. It acquits the reader with the research problem. The following areas of discussion are 
frequently included as subsections in the introduction chapter.40 
• Background of the problem: where the doctrine rose form and where it 
has reached in development. 
• Statement of the problem: brief proclamation of the issue that is being 
addressed in the dissertation 
• Purpose of the study or general objective: the mam goal of the 
dissertation. 
• Research questions or specific objectives or hypotheses: a breakdown of 
the main goal, into sub goals, with each leading to a subtopic to discuss 
in the dissertation 
39 <hu ns : !'lvw lv . l i brarv . strathmore . c: clu /:-~ on 6 February 2017. 
40 Strathmore University dissertation guidelines. 
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• Importance or justification or rationale ofthe study: an explanation into 
the necessity of the dissertation to be done. 
• Scope and limitations of the study: features of the methodology of the 
study that influences or restricts the dissetiation. 
• Definition ofterms: description of terminology used in the dissertation. 
• Chapter summary: a brief statement outlining what each chapter talks 
about. 
2) Sovereignty: a brief history and in contemporary international law: 
This chapter discusses, the various theories that build the doctrine of sovereignty, from 
historical times to modern era. Further looking into sovereignty in crisis and what the grounds 
for it are. 
3) Responsibility to protect: creation and efficiency: 
This chapter looks at the birth of R2P and its development through the years with focuses 
on both successful and failed missions, to determine the most efficient way of applying the 
doctrine. 
4) Bridging the gap between the 2 doctrines for a better solution 
This chapter links the 2 concepts, with a focus on the problems creating a gap between the 
rights and obligations of sovereignty and the solution of applying the original concept of R2P 
without breaching the duties and rights described. 
5) Recommendations and conclusions: 
The objective was to present in a concise form the main findings of the research and the 
implications of this for the topic and discipline. Dissertation research projects provide 
recommendations for practice or improvement and for further studies. In applied research 
recommendations are provided for practice or improvement. In this case the researcher offers 
suggestions for improvement with justification. Research projects often pave way for further 
work. Consequently, the researcher provided suggestions for future research work based on the 
findings and conclusions generated from the study, as well as possible solution to the problem. 
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2 Cha ter 2: An Analysis of Soverei 
2.1 Introduction 
Sovereignty is a political concept that refers to dominant power or supreme authority.41 In a 
monarchy, supreme power resides in the "sovereign", or king. In modern democracies, 
sovereign power rests with the people and is exercised tlu·ough representative bodies such as 
Congress or Parliament. The Sovereign is one who exercises power without limitation. The 
term carries implications of autonomy; to have sovereign power is to be beyond the power of 
others to interfere,42 and thus Sovereignty is the power of a State to do everything necessary to 
govern itself, such as making, executing, and applying laws or making war and peace among 
many other functions, without the interference of outside sources or bodies.43 
Dan Philpott44 believes, Sovereignty has a core meaning of supreme authority within a territory. 
Even though history shows a variety of definitions, it has been come to be understood as a 
modern notion of political authority. Historical variants can be understood along 3 elements-
the holder, the absoluteness, and the internal and external dimensions, of sovereignty in that 
the State is the political institution where sovereignty is embodied, and an accumulation of 
States forms a sovereign States' system. There are vastly differing views on the moral basis of 
sovereignty, fundamentally being between theories that asse1i that sovereignty is vested 
directly in the sovereign by divine or natural right and theories that assert it originates from the 
people. 
Matteo Laruffa noted that: 
"Sovereignty resides in every public action and policy as the exercise of executive powers by 
institutions open to the participation of citizens to the decision-making processes" 45 
41 ' Jean Bodin, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2017 http ://www.icp.utm.edu/bodin/ on 5 August 2017. 
42 'Sovereignty', L/1/ Legal Information Institute, 2017 https://ww'vv.law.cornell.eduiwex/sovcreigni v on 16 
August 2017 . 
43 'Sovereignty I Politics ', Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017 https ://www.britannica.com/topic/sovereigntv on 12 
August 20 17. 
44 ' Daniel Philpott: Sovereignty', P!ato.stanford.edu, 2017 https ://plato.stanforcl.edu/entrie/sovereigntv/ on 12 
August2017. 
45 Matteo L, 'The European Integration and National Interests: from an intergovernmental model to a 
constitutional agreement'. 
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Jellineck rejected the idea that sovereignty was essentially to the State and suggested that it is 
a characteristic of the State by virtue, of which it cannot be legally bound except by its own, or 
limited by any power other than itself.46 
Duguit believed it was the common power of the State, that it is the will of the nation organised 
in the State, and it is the right to give unconditional orders to all individuals in the territory of 
the State, furthering it as the supreme will of the State.47 
Oppenheim said, 
"There exists perhaps no conception the meaning ofwhich is more controversial than that of 
sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was 
introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was 
universally agreed upon JJ . 48 
H. V. Evatt of the High Court of Australia Stated, 
"Sovereignty is neither a question of fact, nor a question of law, but a question that does not 
arise at all JJ . 49 
Sovereignty has taken on a different meaning with the development of the principle of self-
determination and the prohibition against the tlu·eat or use of force as jus cogens norms of 
modern international law. 50 The UN Charter, the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of 
States, and charters of regional international organizations express the view that all States are 
juridically equal and enjoy the same rights and duties based upon the fact of their existence as 
persons under internationallaw. 51 The right of nations to determine their own political status 
46 Sabine G, 'The Concept of the State as Power' 29 the Philosophical Review 4 (1920). 
47 Duiguit L, Traite de droit constitutionnel, Fontemoing, Paris, 1921, 113. 
48 Oppenheim L, International Law: a treatise, Sir Arnold D. McNair (4ed), Longmans Green, London, 1928. 
49 Evatt 1-1 , the Royal Prerogative, Law Book Company, Sydney, 1987. 
50 Akweenda S, Sovereignty in cases of l'vfandated Territories ' International law and the protection of Namibia's 
territorial integrity, Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, Lei den, Netherlands, 1997, 40. 
5 1 UNGA, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties ofStates, UN A/RES/375 (6 December 1949). 
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and exercise permanent sovereignty within the limits of their territorial jurisdictions is widely 
recognized. 52 
In political science, sovereignty is usually defined as the most essential attribute of the State in 
the form of its complete self-sufficiency in the frames of a certain territory that is its supremacy 
in the domestic policy and independence in the foreign one.53 
H0wever, sovereignty is a term that is fiequently misused. Up until the 19th century, the 
radicalized concept of a "standard of civilization" was routinely deployed to determine that 
certain people in the world were "uncivilized", and lacking organised societies. 54 That position 
was reflected and constituted in the notion that their "sovereignty" was either completely 
lacking, or at least of an inferior character when compared to that of "civilized" people. 55 
By the 19111 century, the concept of sovereignty had been perfected by John Austin as a legal 
concept rather than a political one. He brought out the "Legal-Monist Theory of Sovereignty", 
called such due to envision of a single sovereign in the State (which could be an individual or 
even a body of persons) and its link as a legal concept. 56 
He believed sovereignty must reside in a 'determinate' person or body which is the ultimate 
source of power in the State; this power is unlimited and absolute and it can extract obedience 
from others but never render it to any other; this obedience is given voluntarily, and is 
undisturbed and uninterrupted, which is not necessary for all to accept, but only requires a 
52 UNGA, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, I6 December I966, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, val. 999, 17!. 
53 Grinin LE, 'Globalization and Sovereignty: Why do States Abandon their Sovereign Prerogatives?' I Age of 
Globalization (2008), 22- 32 . 
54 Krasner SO, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1991 . 
55 Wilde R, From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again: The Role of the Hague Regulations in the 
Evolution of International Trusteeship, and the Framework of Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers, Loy L.A. 
Int'l & Camp. L. Rev, Los Angeles, 2009, 94 . 
56 Dewey J, ' Austin's Theory of Sovereignty ' 9 Political Science Quarterly I (1894), 31-52. 
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majority, and that there is only one sovereign which is indivisible. 57 Austin also theorised, that 
laws are the commands of the Sovereign which is binding on all within the territory. 58 
A critic of Austin was H. L. A. Hart who brought out that Austin failed to distinguish between 
'being obliged ' to do something by a threat and 'having an obligation' to do it. The position of 
a person with legal obligations is different in kind than the position of someone faced with a 
gunman, but Austin runs the two together. In place of legal obligations consisting in threats of 
punishment, Hart proposed rules as a source of obligation, simply a rule tells you what you 
must do. The difference between Hart and Austin is that Austin identifies obligations with 
being threatened with sanctions while he believes an obligation is something that a rule requires 
you to do. As he sees it, what the law requires you to do is one thing while your motivation for 
complying with the law is something else. 59 As seen below 
The concept of law for Austin and Hart illustrated. 
AUSTIN HART 
__... P·olit ical Sov ereign 
' Rules L~aiSystem 
In Austin's model of a legal system, Political Soeverign is placed on top of the hierarchy 
and rules come after him. In Hart's model of a legal system, the social rules are on top 
of the hierarchy and the sovereign comes under them. 
Social Rule s 
Political 
Sovereign 
57 Austin J, The province of jurisprudence determined, John Murray, London, 1861, "If a determinate human 
superior not in the habit of obedience to a like superior receives habitual obedience from the bulk of a given 
society that determinate superior is sovereign in that society and that society (including the superi01) is a society 
political and independent". 
58 https://plato.stanford.ecluientries/austin-iohn/ on 14 September 20 17. 
59 Hart HLA, "Introduction " to John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, H.L.A. Hmt ed, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1954, vii-xxi. 
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Another point of criticism against Austin's theory is that it is inconsistent with the modern idea 
of popular sovereignty. In his fascination for the legal aspect, he loses sight of popular 
sovereignty which gives the ultirYJate source of authority to the people. Furthermore, while 
defining iaw as the command of the sovereign, he loses sight that in many countries, customary 
laws are supreme and they are not issued in the form of commands. But such laws influence 
the conduct of even despots to a great extent.60 
Pluralism or the Pluralist theory of sovereignty emerged as a reaction against this Monist 
theory, rejecting and denying that sovereignty is the absolute and indivisible supreme power 
of the State. The Pluralist theory recognized the role of several associations in the society, 
formed by man in pursuance of varied interests. Such associations include religious 
organizations, cooperative societies and the like. At best, the State is one of these associations, 
standing side-by-side with them and not above them. The State is not distinct from these 
associations, but acts as mere coordinator in resolving conflicts, by not imposing its own will 
but harmonizing the interests of others so as to secure 'common good' .61 
This is criticized by the thought that if sovereignty is divided among the various associations 
existing in the society, this division will lead to the destruction of sovereignty. As a result, there 
will be chaos and anarchy in the society. Furthermore, some groups in the society may be more 
organized and vocal than other groups and thus the interests of the dominant groups may prevail 
over the vulnerable sections of the society.62 
In comparison, the Marxist view63 is that it is intended to protect the interests of the dominant 
class of society; that the State shall wither away with the development of a classless society. 
Sovereignty of the State is limited by International Law which imposes a check on the absolute 
power of the State. They consider it as a "great stumbling block on the oath of international 
progress." However, the accusation of a restraint of libe1ty and a lack of opportunity was 
derided by and opposed by John Rawls, who believed that a society in time develops on a 
60 Laski HJ, A Grammar of Politics, Routledge, Abingdon, 2014. 
61 Ramp W, 'Paradoxes of sovereignty: Toward a Durkheimian analysis of monarchy ' 14 Journal of Classical 
Sociology 2 (20 14). 
62 Thompson K, Emile Durkheim: Key Sociologists, Psychology Press, 2002. 
63 Flower MR and Bunck JM, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept 
of Sovereignty, Penn State Press, Pennsylvania, 20 I 0. 
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meritocratic model and asserted that the basic purpose of the society which is to assure its 
ci tizens of freedom and opportunity shall be sustained. 64 
2.2 History of Sovereignty 
The term "Sovereignty " has been derived ti-om the Latin word "Superanus " which means 
supreme or paramount. Although the term is modern concept, the idea goes back to Aristotle 
who spoke of the "supreme power of the State ". 65 Throughout the middle Ages, the Roman 
jurists and the civilians kept this idea in their mind and frequently used the terms "Summa 
potestas " and "Plenitudo potestatis " to designate the supreme power ofthe State.66 
The terms "Sovereign" and "Sovereignty " were first used by the French jurists in the 15th 
century and later finding its way into English, Italian and German literature. The use of the 
actual term dates back to the publication ofBodin' s "The Republic " in 1576.67 
This basic principle underlays the dominant Westphalian model of State foundation, which is 
said to be the 1st true act of sovereignty. Most western nations support the preferred term 
derived from Latin (tlu·ough French souverainete), but features, that are also embodied under 
the Chinese term Tianxia, 68 entail certain conditions traditionally seen, as moral imperatives 
for attainment and retentiOn of sovereign rights and powers. 
Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of nation-State sovereignty, based on territoriality and 
the absence of a role for external agents in domestic structures. It is an international system of 
States, multinational corporations, and organizations that began with the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648. 
According to Bryan Turner this system: 
64 b!!J2 :1/www. iep.uim.edu/soc-coni/ on 17 September 2017. 
65 Aristotle, Politics (Book IV Chapter l/), Aeterna Press, London, 2015. 
66 Nootens G, Popular Sovereignty in the West: Polities, Contention, and Ideas, Routledge, Abingdon, 2013. 
67 Bodin J, Les Six Livres de Ia Republique, Du Puys, Paris, 1576, " Sovereignty ... the supreme power ofthe State 
over citizens and subjects unrestrained by law". 
"
8 Bateman CG, 'Nicaea and Sovereignty: Constantine's Council of Nicaea as an Important Crossroad in the 
Development of European State Sovereignty ', 54. 
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"lvfade a more or less clear separation between religion and State, and recognised the right of 
princes 'to confessimwlise · the State, that is, to determine the religious affiliation of their 
kingdoms on the pragmatic principle of cuius regia eius religio. "69 
However this model, has increasingly been scrutinized from the "non-west" as a system 
imposed solely by Western Colonialism as the model made religion a subordinate to politics,70 
which caused dilemmas especially in the Islamic world. It does not fit in the Islamic world 
because concepts such as "separation of church and State" and "individual conscience" are not 
recognised in the Islamic religion as social systems. 
The terms "country", "nation", and "State" are often used as ifthey were synonymous; but in 
stricter usage they can be distinguished; Country denotes a region of land defined by 
geographical features or political boundaries, nation denotes a people who are believed to or 
deemed to share common customs, religion, language, origins, ancestry or history. State refers 
to the set of governing and supportive institutions that have sovereignty over a definite territory 
and population, sovereign states are legal persons. 71 
However, the adjectives national and international are frequently used to refer to matters 
pertaining to what are strictly sovereign States, as in national capital and international law. 
2.3 Types of Sovereignty 
There are four elements or characteristics of a State i.e. population, territory, government and 
sovereignty, hence the State cannot be imagined without sovereignty. It is sovereignty, which 
not only distinguishes the State from other associations, but also gives it superiority over them. 
The precise and definite location of sovereignty, however, is not an easy matter. This problem 
has given rise to distinction between various types of sovereignty namely: legal and political 
sovereignty; titular and actual sovereignty; de jure and de facto sovereignty and popular 
sovereignty; 72 
69 Turner B, ' Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State' 97 the Muslim World 3 (2007), 405-418. 
70 Turner B, 'Is lam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State ' 410 . 
71 http ://studv .corn/aca~lemv/ 1 e sson/the-di fference-between-countries-11 ations-States-and-governments .htn1l on 
9th August 20 17. 
72 Biersteker T and Weber C 'State Sovereignty as Social Construct' Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations, Cambridge University Press ( 1996) 46. 
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2.3 .l Titular vs Actual sovereignty: 
When sovereign powers are vested theoretically, apparently, or in black and white in an 
individual or State institution, it is titular or nominal sovereignty. In such cases real State 
powers belongs to some other person or institution, this type appeared because of the 
parliamentary form of government. When the State sovereignty is practically exercised by an 
individual or institution, it is called actual sovereignty . The best example of this is England 
where the King or Queen is the Titular sovereign and parliament is the actual sovereign, i.e . 
although the State powers are theoretically in the hands of the British Queen, in practice these 
powers are exercised by the British parliament. Another example of this type is Prime Minister 
of India and Prime Minister of Pakistan under original Constitution of 1973.73 
2.3 .2 Legal vs Political sovereignty; 
Sovereign powers of law making vested in an individual or institution by the constitution or 
fundamental law of the land is legal sovereignty. This type of sovereign is provided 
constitutional safeguards and all must obey his laws. The laws made by this type of sovereign 
are final and cannot be question by any one. For example, in Great Britain Parliament is 
constitutionally empowered to exercise State sovereign powers. Many political thinkers, 
scientists and writers reject, the legal concept of sovereignty as too narrow and misleading. 
Dicey, one of them, has said, "Behind the legal sovereignty there is a political sovereignty 
before whom the legal sovereignty must bow."74 This is the political sovereign. In democracies, 
the legal sovereign receives its authority from the electorate, whatever be the basis of the right 
of vote, and is answerable to it for the exercise of its powers. Legal sovereign is subject to be 
changed by the mandate of the electorate at regular intervals. 75 Even during the term of 
Parliament, in the cabinet system of government, legislature may be dissolved and fresh 
mandate from the electorate sought. For example, in a State where the electorates elect political 
institutions, their electorates are sovereignty. In Kenya, the idea of separation of powers and 
tripartite government along with the constitution shows that the citizens are the sovereign76 and 
they who elect the president, Members of Parliamene7 etc. will be. It can be noted then that 
73 The Constitution (Thi1ty-First Amendment) Act, Laws of India, I 973. 
74 Dicey A V, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, I 982 . 
75 Article I 0 I & I 36, Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0). 
76 A1ticle I, Constitution of Kenya (201 0). 
77 Preamble, Article 97 & I 01 , Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0) . 
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parliament's task when legislating and making new iaws is to do so, while keeping in view the 
demands and needs ofthe people of the country. 
2.3.3 Dejure vs De-Facto sovereignty; 
The dejure sovereign is the lawful or constitutional sovereign of the State and recognized by 
the courts. If an individual or institutions exercise the State supreme powers completely and 
permanently, it is dejure sovereignty. States that have dejure sovereignty are recognized by the 
international law. The State power that is temporarily exercised by the individuals or 
institutions is de-facto sovereignty. States where governments are instable or unable to conduct 
international affairs are never permanently recognized by the other States internationally. Such 
a State has de-facto sovereignty. For example, General Pervaiz Musharaf got powers through 
military coup. His government was initially de-facto, but through constitutional amendment 
and restoration of the Constitution, he became the President of Pakistan and hence dejure 
sovereign. 78 
2.3 .4 Popular sovereignty: 
If only the voters are sovereign, it is political sovereignty. If all the citizens irrespective of any 
discrimination, are given equal opportunities to play their role in State activities, it is known as 
popular sovereignty. A good example of this, is the direct democracy in the Greek City State 
of 5th century B.C. There, all citizens were given equal opportunities, in order to play a due 
role in the political activities. 
2.4 Characteristics of sovereignty 79 
2.4.1 Permanence: 
Permanence is the chief characteristic of sovereignty. Sovereignty lasts as long as an 
independent State lasts. The death of the king, the overthrow of the govermnent and the 
addiction of power does not lead to the destruction of sovereignty. It should be kept in mind 
the basic fact that the king or the ruler exercises sovereign power on behalf of the State and, 
therefore, sovereignty will remain as long as there is a State. 
78 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pervez-Musbarraf on 12th August 2017. 
79 Kapur AC, Principles of Political Science, S Chand & Company, India, 1987. 
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Sovereignty does not cease with the death or temporary dispossession of a particular bearer or 
the re-organisation of the State but shifts, immediately to a new bearer, as the centre of gravity 
shifts from one part of physical body to another when it undergoes external change. 
2.4.2 Exclusiveness: 
There cannot be two sovereigns, in one independent State and if the two sovereigns exist in a 
State, the unity of that State will be destroyed. This also applies to a sovereign State within an 
existing sovereign State, it cannot exist. 
2.4.3 All Comprehensiveness: 
The State is all comprehensive and the sovereign power is universally applicable. Every 
individual and every association of individual is subject to the sovereignty of the State. No 
association or group of individuals, however, rich or powerful it may be, can resist or disobey 
the sovereign authority. 
Sovereignty makes no exception and grants no exemption to anyone, except exemptions 
granted in the case of foreign embassies and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries on 
the reciprocal basis. This does not in any way restrict the sovereignty of the State in the legal 
sense. The State can abolish and withdraw the diplomatic privileges granted to foreigners. 
2.4.4 Inalienability: 
Inalienability is another characteristic of sovereignty, in that the State cannot part with its 
sovereignty. In other words, the sovereign does not remain the sovereign or the sovereign State, 
if he, she or the State transfers his, hers or its sovereignty to any other person or any other State. 
Sovereignty is the life and soul of the State and it cam10t be alienated without destroying the 
State itself. As Lieber has very aptly remarked in this connection: "Sovereignty can no more 
be alienated than a tree can alienate its right to sprout or a man can transfer his life or personality 
to another without self-destruction". 80 
2.4.5 Imperscriptibility: 
That is, if the sovereign does not exercise his sovereignty for a certain period of time, it does 
not lead to the destruction of sovereignty. This implies that sovereignty can neither be 
destroyed nor lost if it has not been exercised for a long period. People may not have exercised 
80 Lieber F, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, Nabu Press, Charleston, 1839. 
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sovereignty for some time due to control by a foreign power, but non-exercise of sovereign 
power does not put an end to sovereignty itself. 
2.4.6 Indivisibility: 
Indivisibility is the life-blood of sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot be divided, American 
Statesman Calhoun has declared, "Sovereignty is an entire thing; to divide it is to destroy it. It 
is the supreme power in a State and we might just well divide it is to destroy it. It is the supreme 
power in a State and we might just well speak of half square or half a triangle as half a 
sovereignty" . 81 
2.4.7 Absoluteness: 
Sovereignty is absolute and unlimited. The sovereign is entitled to do whatsoever he likes, and 
sovereignty is subject to none. This means that neither within the State nor outside it, is there 
any power which is superior to the sovereign. The will of the sovereign reigns supreme in the 
State, his, hers or its obedience to customs of the State or international law is based on his, hers 
or its own free will. 
2.4.8 Originality: 
The sovereign wields power by virtue of his own right and not by virtue of anybody ' s mercy . 
Sovereignty cannot be manufactured, and the dependence on another for supreme power cannot 
make a State a sovereign one. 
2.5 Two Aspects of Sovereignty: 
There are two aspects of sovereignty: internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. 
Internal Sovereignty means some persons, assembly of group of persons in every independent 
State have the final legal authority to command and enforce obedience. This sovereignty 
exercises its absolute authority over all individuals or associations of the individuals within the 
State. Professor Harold Laski has remarked that "It issues orders to all men and all associations 
81 Calhoun JC, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government oft he United States, in Union and Liberty, Steam 
Press, South Carolina, 1851 , I 05. 
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within that area; it receives orders ji-om none of them. It will is subject to no legal limitation 
of any kind What it proposes is right by mere announcement of intention". 82 
External sovereignty that the State is subject to no other authority and is independent of any 
compulsion on the part of other States. Every independent State reserves the authority to 
renounce trade treaties and to enter into military agreements. Each State is independent of other 
States and every iildependent State is at liberty to determine its foreign policy and to join any 
bloc of power it likes . Any other State does not reserve any right to interfere with the external 
matter of an independent State. Thus, by external sovereignty it would mean that every State 
is independent of other States. 
In other words, external sovereignty means national freedom. Professor Laski has observed 
that, "The modern State is a sovereign State. It is, therefore, independent in the face of other 
communities. It may infuse its will towards them with a substance which need not be affected 
by the will of any external power".83 
This Statement makes it very clear that the State possesses both external and internal 
sovereignty. 
State sovereignty rs sometimes viewed synonymously with independence, however, 
sovereignty can be transferred as a legal right whereas independence cannot. A State can 
achieve de facto independence long after acquiring sovereignty, such as in the case of 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.84 Additionally, independence can also be suspended when an 
entire region becomes subject to an occupation such as when Iraq had been overrun by the 
forces who took part in the Iraq War of2003. 
Iraq had not been annexed by any country, so its sovereignty during this period has not and is 
not been contested by any State including those present on the territory. Alternatively, 
independence can be lost completely when sovereignty itself becomes the subject of dispute. 
The pre-World War II administrations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia maintained an exile 
existence (and considerable international recognition) whilst the entities were armexed by the 
82 Morefield J, 'States Are Not People: Harold Laski on Unsettling Sovereignty, Rediscovering Democracy' 58 
Political Research Quarterly, (2005), 659-699. 
83 Morefield J, 'States Are Not People: Harold Laski on Unsettling Sovereignty, Rediscovering Democracy' 665. 
84 Talmon S, Recognition ofGovernments in International Law, Oxford Monographs in International Law Series, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1998, 50. 
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Soviet Union and governed locally by their pro-Soviet functionaries. When in 1991 Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia re-enacted independence, it was done so on the basis of continuity 
directly from the pre-Soviet republics . 85 Another complicated sovereignty scenario can arise 
when regime itself is the subject of dispute. In the case of Poland, the People's Republic of 
Poland which governed Poland from 1945 to 1989 is now seen to have been an illegal entity 
by the modern Polish administration. The post-1989 Polish State claims direct continuity from 
the Second Polish Republic which ended in 1939. For other reasons however, Poland maintains . 
its communist-era outline as opposed to its pre-Worid War II shape which included areas now 
in Belarus, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia and Ukraine but did not include some of its 
western regions that were then in Germany. 86 
At the opposite end of the scale, there is no dispute regarding the self-governance of ce1iain 
self-proclaimed States such as Republic of Abkhazia, Republic of South Ossetia or the 
Republic of Kosovo since their governments neither answer to a bigger State, nor is their 
governance subjected to supervision. The sovereignty (i .e. legal right to govern) however, is 
disputed in all three cases as the first two entities are claimed by Georgia and the third by 
Serbia. 87 
2.6 Conclusion 
The concept of sovereignty, once relatively uncontested, has recently become a major bone of 
contention within international law and international relations theory. Rather than 
presupposing that the concept of sovereignty has a timeless or universal meaning, more recent 
scholars have focused on the changing the meaning of this concept across a variety of historical 
and political contexts. 
Often, however, the term sovereignty is invoked in a context or manner designed to avoid and 
prevent analysis, sometimes with an advocate's intent to fend off criticism or justifications for 
85 Malksoo L, Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: The Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic States by the 
USSR, M. Nijhoffpublishers, Leiden, Netherlands, 2003, !93. 
86 Matteo L, 'The European Integration and National Interests: from an intergovernmental model to a 
constitutional agreement'. 
87 Heuser B, ' Sovereignty, self-determination and security: new world orders in the 20th century ', in Hashmi S, 
State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations, Pennsylvania University Press, 
Philadelphia, 1997. 
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international infringements on the activities of a State or its internal stakeholders. In addition 
to the 'power monopoly ·' function, sovereignty also plays other important roles. For example, 
the concept is central to the idea of 'equality of nations', which can be abused and, at times, is 
dysfunctional oJ!.d unrealistic, such as in inducing consensus as a way to avoid the 'one nation, 
one vote' approach to decision making in international institutions. 
This approach can sometimes seriously misdirect actions of those institutions and, can often 
lead to p3.ralysis, damaging appropriate coordination and other decision making at the 
international leveL The concept of equality of nations is linked to sovereignty because it has 
fostered the idea that there is no higher power than the State, so if s 'sovereignty' negates the 
idea that there is a higher power, whether foreign or international (unless consented to by the 
State). 
Sovereignty also plays a role in defining the status and rights of States and their officials. Thus, 
we recognize sovereign immunity and the consequential immunity for various purposes of the 
officials of a State . Similarly, sovereignty implies a right against interference or intervention 
by any foreign (or international) power, this can also play an antidemocratic role in enforcing 
extravagant concepts of special privilege of government officials. Therefore, one can easily see 
the logical c01mection between the sovereignty concepts and the very foundations and sources 
of international law. If sovereignty implies that there is no higher power than the State, then it 
is argued that no international law norm is valid unless the State has somehow consented to it, 
which it would seem that they do so in treaties. This almost always implies, the legitimate 
consent of the States that accepted them, yet there is no form of persecution or punishment 
when treaties are breached. 
National government leaders and politicians, as well as special interest representatives, too 
often invoke the term sovereignty to forestall needed debate . Likewise, international elites 
often assume that "international is better" (thus downplaying the importance of sovereignty) 
and this is not always the better approach. 
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3 Cha[!t~r...l;_Respo~sibility to Protect 
3.1 Introduction 
The tragic events in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century in Darfur, Kosovo, 
Rwanda, Liberia, Srebrenica and Sierra Leone among many others have triggered a 
fundamental rethinking of the role and responsibiiity of the international community in times 
of a crisis. In these and many other cases the international community, and for mostly the 
security council, failed to uphold their promise and aspiration set after WWII, to prevent 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other mass atrocities. With the over the 
head truth, the simple lack of a strong action and response in the time of need, led to the failure 
of humanity as a whole, in various parts of the world. 
Without the strong political will and support, plausible actions simply did not take place on 
time and thus millions of lives were lost, clue to either no response or one that was simply just 
too late. 
The 1990s was the decade of truth for the international community in confronting genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, and major crimes against humanity and war crimes. After decades of political 
leaders and policymakers saying "never again" to another Holocaust or Cambodia, they failed 
the test miserably when it came to a series of unfolding catastrophes in Africa and the Balkans: 
responding either not at all, with too little too late, or with insufficient UN authority. The debate 
was always about the pros and cons of coercive military intervention - and an apparently 
unbridgeable gulf opened up between those, mainly from the global North, arguing for a "right 
of humanitarian intervention", and those, mainly from the global South, insisting that, whatever 
the nature or scale of human rights horrors occurring behind state walls, national sovereignty 
was sacrosanct and coercive intervention impermissible. 88 
This was the climate that led UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his 2000 Millennium 
Report, to make his famous challenge: "If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable 
assault on state sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica- to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
88 Tharoor Sand Daws S, ' Humanitarian Intervention: Getting Past the Reefs ' 18 World Policy Journal (2001) . 
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humanity?"89 And it was this challenge that stimulated the Canadian Government to establish 
the ICISS, ·which initiated in 2001, the new concept of " the responsibility to protect" (R2P).90 
3o2 Th{~ Responsibility to Protect conceptualization 
The R2P, at first glance, encompasses a radical and controversial new approach in international 
relations and international law. The basic definition of the concept embodies two interlinking 
elements. The first of these is that sovereignty implies responsibility in the state apparatus to 
ensure the protection of all persons residing within the territory of the state from genocide, 
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. The second element of the doctrine 
asserts an international responsibility upon all states to act when the population of another state 
is suffering serious harm from the international crimes outlined above - as a result of internal 
war, insurgency, repression or state failure- and the sovereign state concerned is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert the suffering. 
The novel feature of this concept is in the second element: the idea of an obligation of a state 
not only to protect the welfare and human rights of persons within its borders but as a member 
of the international community of states, to protect humanity as a whole. 
The concept of R2P was comprehensively formulated in 2001. Forceful intervention for 
humanitarian purposes has been problematic due to the principles of State sovereignty and non-
intervention. The traditional conceptualisation of sovereignty was an effective shield for a 
State in respect of its domestic affairs, despite its misconduct or atrocities towards its 
citizemy.91 As a way of resolving intervention difficulties associated with the traditional 
approach, the Commission used a rhetorical strategy by conceiving sovereignty as a 
responsibility rather than contro1.92 The Commission also sought to address the dilemmas and 
undesirability of intervention for humanitarian purposes by changing the perspective of action 
from that of a right to intervene to the more acceptable and less controversial responsibility to 
89 Millennium Report of the Secretary General, We the peoples: role of the United Nations in the 2 I"" century. 
90 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
9 1 Sarkin J, 'The Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa's Sub-Regional Organizations in 
Dealing with Africa's Human Rights Problems: Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to 
Protect' 53 Jmmwl of African Law (2009) 4. 
92 Stahn C, ' Respcnsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? ' I 0 I American Joumal of 
lntemational Law 99 (2007) I 02. 
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protect. 93 Intervention for humanitarian purposes under the ICISS Report was premised on a 
continuum of obligations that extend beyond coercive action. It included responsibility to 
prevent and responsibility to rebuildY4 
The concept vvas a political commitment unanimously adopted by all members of the UNGA 
at the 2005 World Summit and articulated in paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement; through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
·with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to 
continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations ji-om genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the 
principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations ji-om 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those 
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 
93 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
94 McClean E, 'The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of international Human Rights Law' 13 Journal ofConjlict 
and Security Law (2008) 123, 139. 
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The above paragraphs serve as the basis for the inter-govenu11ental agreement to the R2P. The 
UNGA hnther adopted this into resolution 60/1 of2005.95 The body subsequently committed 
to continue consideration of the R2P with its Resolution 308Y6 The UN Security Council first 
reaffirmed the R2P in Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, recalling 
in particular paragraphs of the Sununit Outcome regarding the R2P populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.97 
The original report and conceptualization of the concept, included various intervention reasons 
such as natural disasters, however Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit 
refined the scope to the four crimes mentioned, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity, commonly referred to as 'atrocity crimes' or 'mass atrocity 
crimes'. 
Although much as been done for this concept to become a reality, it is important to note it is 
still a political idea and not legally binding, and as such the UN cannot implement or act on 
such a doctrine without the consent of the States it serves. The failings thus, are not the UN s 
but the States in the Security Council who do not implement R2P in its truest form and within 
reasonable time. These failings have also been blamed on peacekeepers unable or unwilling to 
act,98 as well as different organisations not working well together.99 
As per the Secretary-General's 2009 Report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 100 
"The responsibility to protect applies, until lvfember States decide otherwise, only to the four 
specified crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity ... To try to extend it to cover other calamities, such as HIVIAIDS, climate change or 
the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept 
beyond recognition or operational utility. " 
95 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. 
96 UNGA, The responsibility to protect, UN A/Res/63/308 (7 October 2009) . 
97 UNSC 1674 (2006). 
98 The Netherlands v. Nuhanovic, Supreme Colllt ofNetherlands, No. 12/03324, [2013]. 
99 Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European .Communities, Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 3 September 2008, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P. 
10° Ki-Moon B, United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009, 
UN Doc A/63/677 . 
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The focused scope is part of what the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, has termed a 
"narrow but deep approach" to R2P: A narrow application to four crimes, but a deep approach 
to response, employing the wide array of prevention and protection instnm1ents available to 
Member States, the UN system, regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society. 
In the same report, he f1.trther emphasizes the three impmiant pillars that R2P is based on: 
i) Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state; 
ii) Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building; 
iii) Pillar III: Timely and decisive response. 
Further reminding that the 3 are not sequential but of equal importance and thus; 
"Without all three, the concept would be incomplete. All three pillars must be implemented in 
a manner fully consistent with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter. "101 
3.3 How does it differ from Humanitarian Intervention? 
R2P is a new concept that gives an entirely new dimension to the protection of human lives 
and dignity. It has a much larger view then simple intervention, primarily the pt step being 
prevention of atrocities. It is more sensible to say that intervention is a part of R2P, however it 
is only a small part. R2P is a larger, it recognises the need to prevent before protect and thus 
furthers provides for a large array of tools and policies that can stop mass crimes before they 
even occur. 
The R2P differs from humanitarian intervention in four ways. 
1) Humanitarian intervention only refers to the use of military force, whereas R2P is first 
and foremost a preventive principle that emphasizes a range of measures to stem the 
risk of genocide, war crimes, etlmic cleansing or crimes against humanity before the 
crimes are tlu·eatened or occur. The use of force may only be carried out as a measure 
last resort, when all other non-coercive measures have failed, and only when it is 
authorized by the UN Security Council. This is in contrast to the principle of 
'humanitarian intervention', which allows for the use of force as a humanitarian 
imperative without the authorization of such bodies like the Security Council. 102 
10 1 Ki-Moon B, United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and decisive 
response, 2012, UN Doc A/66/874-S/20 12/578. 
102 Adams S, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, 2012. 
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2) As a principle, and although it is a political concept, the R2P is rooted firmly in existing 
international resolutions provided by the UNGA and the UNSC as well as the AU's 
constitutive act, especially in resolutions dealing with the law relating to sovereignty, 
peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict. 103 
3) While humanitarian interventions have in the past been justified in the context of 
varying situations, R2P focuses only on the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, 104 war 
crimes, 105 crimes against humanity 106 and etlmic cleansing. The first three crimes are 
clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute that established 
the International Criminal Court. Ethnic cleansing is not a crime defined under 
international law, but has been defined by the UN as "a purposeful policy designed by 
one etlmic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the 
civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic 
areas" .107 This isn't a right served to just the nationals of the State but also foreigners 
living within the territory of the State. Protection from these crimes is erga omnes, i.e. 
rights owed to all. 108 
4) Humanitarian intervention assumes a "right to intervene", the R2P is based on a 
"responsibility to protect". Humanitarian intervention and the R2P both agree on the 
fact that sovereignty is not absolute. However, the R2P doctrine shifts away from state-
centred motivations to the interests of victims by focusing not on the right of states to 
intervene but on a responsibility to protect populations at risk. 109 
3.4 R2P in practice 
The international community and the UN in particular, as deemed by the Chatier of the UN, is 
deemed to have a residual responsibility to intervene, through collective action to protect the 
103 Bellamy A, Davis Sand Glanville L, The responsibility to Protect and International Law, Brill , Netherlands, 
2010. 
104 Article 6, Rome Statute of the lntemational Criminai Court, UNTS 2187. 
105 Article 8, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
106 Article 7, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
107 Lellerto the President of the Security Council, UNSC, 1994, UN doc S/ 1994/674. 
108 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, 
para. 33 . 
109 Haider H, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, International legal frameworks for humanitarian action: 
Topic guide, 2013. 
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populations, where a State is either the author of such atrocities or is manifestly unable to 
protect its own population.110 Although it should be noted that the UN is not mandated to 
succeed in complete prevention of the atrocities, it is however tasked to use all means ne'cessary 
to prevent the beginning or continuation of the crimes. Although peaceful means of 
intervention may be involved, it includes enforcement action in a timely and decisive manner 
where other means fail or are inadequate. 111 In the R2P discourse, execution of enforcement 
action is preserved within the UN collective security, meaning authorization by the Security 
Council. 1 ; 2 In addition, intervention may be undertaken by regional organisations such as the 
African Union (AU), including enforcement action where necessary. 113 
3.4.1 Kenya 2007/08 
Kenya was swept by a wave of ethnic violence that left thousands dead and even more 
displaced, triggered by the disputed elections in 2007, between December 2007 and January 
2008. External intervention was instant with the French Foreign and European Affairs Minister 
Bernard Kouchner making a plea to the UN Security Council in January 2008 to react "in the 
name of the responsibility to protect" before Kenya plunged into a lethal ethnic conflict. The 
former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also issued a statement expressing concern for the 
violence, calling for the population to remain calm and for Kenyan security forces to show 
restraint. On 10 January 2008, Kofi Annan was accepted by both sides of the conflict as the 
AU Chief Mediator. Mediation efforts led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement between 
both parties in February 2008. 114 
11 0 HLP, A More Secure World, Our Scared Responsibility, supra note. 8, para. 203. 
111 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, supra 
note 10, para.l39. 
11 2 HLP, A More Secure World, Our Scared Responsibility, supra note 9, para. 203 . 
11 3 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit; 
' 'Regional organization ' s role in the maintenance of international peace and security is recognized in Chapter VIII 
of the UN Chatter. Under Article 53(1) ofthe Charter, regional organizations may undertake enforcement action 
but with the authorization of the Security Council." 
11 4 'Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of governance : The Response of 
International Actors' Human Rights Watch https ://ww>v .hrw.org/repmts/2008/kenva0308/ l O.htm on 20 
September 20 17. 
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3.4.2 Ivory Coast 2011 
In March 2011, in response to the escalating post-election violence against the population of 
Ivory Coast, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1975 condemning the gross 
human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex-President Laurent Gbagbo and 
President Ouattara. The resolution cited "the primary responsibility of each State to protect 
civilians", called for the immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the 
elections, and reaffirmed that the UN Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) could use "all 
necessary means to protect life and property." On 4 April2011, in an effort to protect the people 
of Ivory Coast fl.·om further atrocities, UNOCI began a military operation, and President 
Gbagbo's hold on power ended on 11 April when he was arrested by President Ouattara's 
forces. 115 
3 .4.3 Libya 2011 
Following widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the Libyan 
regime, and language used by Muammar Gaddafi that reminded the international community 
of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970, making 
explicit reference to the R2P. Deploring what it called "the gross and systematic violation of 
human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence, 
"recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population", and imposed a series 
of international sanctions, further adopting resolution 1973, which declared use of all necessary 
measures in order to stop the regime, making it the first time military intervention was cited 
with R2P. 116 
3.5 The African l .Jnion & Article 4(h) of the Constitutive 
Act. 
Although many believe that the implementation of R2P began with the UN and is a western 
conceptualization, it was, in fact, Afl.·ican countries and the AU that pioneered it into reality, 
not only in the four mass atrocity crimes but other disasters and crises as well. 
In 2003 the AU lead peacekeeping mission in Burundi which was successfully implemented 
before the formal endorsement of the R2P concept by the UNGA in 2005. Despite this not 
11 5 https:i/w;vw.un.orgicn/peucekeeping/miss ionsiunoGi/e l.::ctions.html on 21 September 2017. 
11 6 'Crisis in Libya' Responsibility to protect IYebsite http:/iresponsibilitvtoprotect.org/index.php/cnses/crisis-in-
libva#violence on 21 September 2017. 
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being a direct case of implementation of the emerging norm by the AU, it is a significant 
example in examining the AU's following practice, especially in demonstrating the Union's 
intervention capacity. It is an important case that is considered while making a balanced 
analysis on whether the AU has effectively institutionalized the concept of responsible 
sovereignty, which is the central concern. Thus, as Evans observes, the Burundi intervention is 
a perfect example of how the responsibility to protect concept can function. 1 17 
The African Union, in 2000, sat down to include, Article 4H, to the Union's constitutive act, 
otherwise known as the right to intervene which declares 
"the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity". 118 
Article 4(h), provides for a right to intervene in grave circumstances or a serious tlu·eat to 
legitimate order' in a member state 'to restore peace and stability to the member state upon 
recommendation ofthe Peace and Security Council', 119 leading to the departure ofthe OAU's 
basic principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of states. 120 
It was against a background of a number of failures of member states to solve disputes 
peacefully, amicably, and amongst themselves such as in Somalia, DRC, Rwanda, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone as well as Ivory Coast and Burundi that lead to African leader including the right 
to intervene in the new constitutive act, it could also be attributed to the paralysis of states due 
to the strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention. 121 The principle has now been 
reformulated so that it does not apply to actions applied collective by member states, but not to 
sole interference by a single state in the internal affairs of another member state. 122 
117 Evans G, 'The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come . .. and Gone?' 22 International 
Relations (2008). 
118 Article 4 (h), Constitutive act of the Aji-ican Union, II July 2000. 
119 Article 4, Protocol on Amendment to the Constitutive Act of the Aji-ican Union, II July 2003. 
120 Article 3 (2), Charter of the Organization of Aji-ican Unity, 25 May 1963. 
121 'Ben Kioko: The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to 
Non-Intervention' International committee of the Red Cross, 31 December 2003 
l1ttps: //www. icrc.org/eng!resources/documents/mticle/other/5wnjctl.htm on 30 September 2017. 
122 Article 4 (g), Constitutive act of the Aji-ican Union. 
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The conceptual problem of this is the 'legitimate order' , which is not easily defined in a 
continent, that since independence has a large number of coups, civil wars, and dictatorships, 
thus being too elusive and fragile to actually be used to exercise the right to intervene. It 
required to be further developed and crystalised, before being fully implemented. 
It would be more sound for the delimitation of the scope into specific crimes, such as genocide, 
war crimes etc. which are defined and established in international law. This is further 
established by the Peace and Security Council under article 7(e) giving them the power to, 123 
"recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(71) of the Constitutive Act, intervention on 
behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and 
instrument " 
The wording of 4 (h) limits the circumstances that can justify the intervention by member states 
to 3 specific situation, thus if those 3 did not exist or in the opinion of the Peace and Security 
Council were not considered, then the union cannot intervene, unless asked to do so as seen in 
article 4 (j). 124 
This was seer1 in the Gambia in early 2017, where the ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia 
(ECOMIG), saw the intervention of a number of West African states in the Gambia to resolve 
a breakdown of internal order in the government of the Gambia due to a constitutional crisis in 
a dispute over the country's presidency. The intervention was based upon the newly elected 
president of Gambia Adam a Barrow's request. 125 
Otherwise under article 13 of the Peace and Security Council Protocol: 126 
"In order to enable the Peace and Security Council to pe1jorm its responsibilities with respect 
to the deployment ofpeace support missions and intervention pursuant to Article 4(h) and (G) 
of the Constitutive Act, an Aji-ican standby force shall be established." 
12 3 Article 7 (e), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 
9 July 2002 
124 Article 4 U), Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
125 'Paul Williams: A New African Model of Coercion? Assessing the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia' !PI 
Globed Observat01y .h!!Rs:i/theglobalobservatorv.on:oi"O 17 /03/ecowas-gam bia-ba1row-jamrneh-african-union/ on 
30 September 2017 . 
126 Article 13, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Councii of the African Union. 
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This implies that intervention is used in the context of the AU in the sense of coercive action 
involving armed force in a Member State without the consent of the government of that State, 
which can be either; 127 
1) Political, Economic or other sanctions 
2) International criminal prosecution 
3) Military intervention for humanitarian ends 
Although the AU focuses mainly on the latter, leaving the upper 2 aside, in so far as article 4(h) 
is concerned. This contravenes the UN charters principles. 
The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by States individually or collectively against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of other States. 128 There are only two 
exceptions to this rule. 
1) The right of individual or collective self-defence in case of an armed attack against a 
Member ofthe United Nations. 129 
2) The system of collective security, under which the Security Council may take military 
enforcement action to maintain or restore international peace and security. In the 
exercise of this prerogative, the Security Council may utilize regional organizations for 
enforcement action under its authority. However, the Charter prohibits such regional 
organization from undertaking enforcement action at their own initiative and without 
the authorization of the Security Council. 130 
The authority and competence of regional arrangements for dealing with matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security are clearly recognized in article 52(1) 131 but is 
subject to two conditions. 
1) Matters dealt with by the regional arrangements with regard to the maintenance of peace 
and security must be "appropriate for regional action", and 
2) Such arrangements themselves as well as well as their activities must be "consistent 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations". 
127 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
128 Article 2 (4), Charter of the United Nations . 
129 Article 51 , Charter of the United Nations. 
130 Article 53 (I), Charter of the United Nations. 
13 1 Article 52 (1), Charter ofthe United Nations. 
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This concept has evolved over the years with the UN, as it further considers mass atrocity 
crimes within borders as a tlu·eat to international peace and security, as well as the need to 
protect human security within states. 132 As well as its use of regional organizations and 
coalitions of states to implement Chapter VI1 133 enforcement measures. 1:;4 Thus it can be argued 
that this shows the lJN's willingness and approval of regional actions, including those 
undertaken by the AU, for dealing with internal wars and crimes. 
The willingness of the AU to work with the UN and the Security Council as well as stay within 
the principles and purposes of the UN Charter can be seen in Article 17 of the Peace and 
Security Protocol , which established the AU's inclination to not only cooperate but recognize 
that the primary responsibility of maintenance of peace on the African continent is theirs and 
the rest of the worlds being the Security Council ' s.135 The AU will not embark on an 
enforcement action without the blessing or the support of the UN organs, although upon failure 
of action from the UN or the Security Council, the AU stills empowers itself to meet its 
obligations to save human lives and protect Humanity. 
Further supporting this, the UN Secretary General , Kofi Annan stated: 136 
"To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use afforce 
in the absence of Security Council mandate, one might ask -not in the context of Kosovo- but 
in the context of Rvvanda: !fin those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition 
ofStates had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt 
Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to 
unfold. " 
This led to an ambitious reform to the security council being asked by the African states, known 
as the 'Ezulwini Consensus ' and the Sirte Declaration, which calls for the change in the 
132 Ki-Moon 8 , United Nations, Office of the Secretary General , Fulfilling our co/iective responsibility: 
International assistance and the Responsibility to Protect, 20 I 4, A/68/94 7-S/20 14/449. 
133 Chapter VII , Charter of the United Nations. 
13
• Ki-Moon 8 , United Nations, Office of the Secretary General , The role of regional and sub-regional 
arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect, 20 I I , UN Doc A/65/877-S/20 I I/393. 
135 Article I 7, Protocol Relating to the Estabiishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. 
136 ' Kofi Annan : Secretary-General Presents his Annual Report to General Assembiy', UN Press Release, 20 
September I 999 https:i/wv.:w. un.ondpress/en/ 1999/ 199909'0.sgsm 7 l 36.html on 30 September 20 I 7. 
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Security Council from its cunent standing to include two permanent seats and five non-
permanent seats for African State. 137 
In his speech to the 62nd session of the UNGA, President Mbeki of South Africa captures the 
Ezulwini Consensus convincingly when he says: "Although the concepts of ji-eedom and 
equality are universal andfitlly embraced by the United Nations, this global organization has 
not itself transformed and designed the necessary institutions of governance consistent with 
the noble ideals that drive modern democratic societies. "138 He believes that when almost 70% 
of the decisions made affect the African States it is their right to be involved in every decision 
made for them. 
3.6 The Legal and Political Value of R2P 
There have been significant commendations of the concept, especially within the UNGA. 139 
Although UNGA resolutions are not binding as such upon States, they constitute an important 
part of State practice and international principles. 140 State practice and opinio juris sive 
necessitates are vital in the development of customary international law. 141 142 R2P has been 
recommended in the High-Level Panel Report (HLP), 143 the World Summit Outcome 
Document, 144 among many other documents and in September 2009, the UNGA resolved that 
13 7 Afi·ican Union , the Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini 
Consensus, Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) 8 March 2005. 
13 8 http:/ /ww;v. an c. org. zn/ content/ u n -speech -ad dress- president-thnbo-m bek i -6 2nd-session-united-nations-
general-assemblv on 3 October 20 I 7. 
139 Ki-Moon B, United Nations, Office of the Secretary General , Responsible Sovereignty: International 
Cooperation for a Changed World speech, 2008. 
14 0 Higgins R, 'The Attitude of Western States towards Legal Aspects ofthe Use of Force', in Cassese A (Ed), the 
Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1986, 435 . 
141 Militmy and Paramilitmy Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 
ICJ Reports 1986,14. 
142 " In respect of opinio juris, the International Court of Justice pointed out that it infers a belief that certain 
conduct has become obligatory due to "the existence of a rule of law requiring it ... States concerned must 
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation." North Sea Continental Shelf 
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic ofGennany v. Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1969,3. 
143 HLP, A More Secure World, Our Scared Responsibility. 
14 4 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, para. 
138-139. 
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States would continue discussions on the matter. 145 There have been annual deliberations on 
the concept under the support of the UNGA, such as the July 2011 informal thematic debate. 146 
In addition, the concept has also been endorsed by the Security Council. 147 The R2P concept is 
based on existing law and institutions, in addition to some of the past experiences within the 
international community. l48 An example is the Genocide Convention, which in A1iicle VIII 
obligates States to prevent the occurrence of genocide.149 The concept "pulls pre-existing 
norms together and places them in a novel framework" .150 The nonnative element and value of 
the concept has however been questioned by some scholars, it has been alleged that there lacks 
any clear consequences for the failure to implement the R2P concept, in addition, a lack of will 
to implement it, and it is, therefore, inappropriate to classify the concept as an emerging 
nonn. 151 Anne Orford acknowledges that some scholars are of the erroneous view that the 
concept lacks any normative value or significance due to the assumption that it does not impose 
any new binding obligations on States or regional organizations. 152 Orford instructively points 
out that the R2P concept raises significant legal issues, even if it does not translate into binding 
legal obligations .153 She observes that the concept represents a form of law that grants powers 
and provides jurisdiction to the international community for intervention purposes. 154 Although 
it is still doubtful that the concept can be classified as a proper norm of international law, it has 
previously been endorsed by the UNGA and the Security Council, 155 and thus qualifies to be 
14 5 'General Assembly Agrees to Hold More Talks on Responsibility to Protect ' UN News Centre, 14 September 
2009 htip:!/www .un .on.!/apps/news/storv. asp?News!D=3? 04 7 &Cr=responsibilitv+to+proteCt&Cr I on 3 October 
2017. 
146 "'For Those Facing Mass Rape and Violence, the Slow Pace of Global Deliberations Offers No Relief', 
Secretary-General Cautions m General Assembly Debate ' UNGA , 12 July 2011 on 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/?O 11 /ga 1 I 11 2.doc.htm on 3 October 2017. 
14 7 UNSC 1674 (2006). 
14 8 Arbour L, 'The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice', 34 Review of 
International Studies (2008) 447- 448. 
149 Article Vlii, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
150 Peters A, 'The Security Council ' s Responsibi I ity to Protect' 8 International Organizations Law Review (20 I 1 ) . 
15 1 Kapur A, ' Humanity as the A and D of Sovereignty: Four Replies to Anne Peters ' 20 European Journal of 
International Law (2009) 560-562. 
152 Orford A, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 20 II, 22-
23. 
153 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect. 
154 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect. 
155 HLP, A More Secure Warfel, Our Scared Responsibility; 
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regarded as an emergmg norm. The legal and political value of the concept may also be 
discerned from the fact that the concept establishes a framework for complementarity between 
State sovereignty and intervention for humanitarian purposes, thereby eliminating the 
problematic tension between the two fundamental principles. The former UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon aclmowledges the normative value of the concept, stating that it "is now 
well established in international law and practice that sovereignty does not bestow impunity on 
those who organize, incite or commit crimes relating to the responsibility to protect." 156 
3.7 Pro and Cons ofR2P 
There is a considerable number of thinkers and decision makers backing R2P which is also a 
powerful and effective political lobby group. Various think-tanks, research institutes, and 
international organizations are advocating the growth and adoption of R2P principles. 
Jetmifer Welsh, the current UN Special Adviser on R2P, has emphasized that the focus of her 
tenure is mainstreaming the R2P norm while simultaneously turning an emphasis towards Pillar 
II, namely the International Community's responsibility to protect states in growing capacity 
to better protect their citizens from crimes. 157 
Louise Arbour, of the International Crisis Group, said that R2P is the most important and 
imaginative doctrine to emerge on the international scene for decades. 158 
Anne-Marie Slaughter from Princeton University has called it the most important shift in our 
conception of sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 159 
On the opposite side, many critics have focused on the risk that it creates a "moral outrage and 
hysteria", a dangerous Western "right to intervene" through humanitarian interventions often 
concealing the true strategic aim, thus becoming another name for the proxy war. They argue 
it is either too ambitious, a new form of colonialism with a fancy name, or it has been 
UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. 
15 6 Ki-Moon B, United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. 
157 Welsh J, Thematic Panel Convened by the President of the General Assembly, From Commitment to 
Implementation: Ten Years of the Responsibility to Protect (20 16). 
158 Arbour L, 'The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice', 445 . 
159 Evans G, The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Lntervention', 78-79 . 
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significantly watered down as it was evident during the Libyan crisis in 2011, when regime 
change, rather than civilian protection and moral principles, was a priority. 160 
In particular, India's UN Ambassador Singh Puri stated that the Libyan case gave R2P a bad 
name. "Arms were supplied to civilians without any consideration of its consequences, a no-
fly zone was estabiished only for flights in and out Tripoli and targeted measures were 
implemented insofar as they suited the objective of regime change". 161 
Russia and China both issued statements to the effect that in their opinion R2P had been abused 
by the US as a pretext for regime change and that experience would make them extremely 
suspicious of any future Security Council Resolution invoking R2P. 162 
Advocates of R2P, in contrast, find in the Libyan episode a vindication, signalling that 
humanitarian intervention does not require state consent and asserted the central role of the 
UNSC. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The R2P concept is still very much a developing norm and its acceptance varies according to 
the needs of each organization. 
Being a norm and not a law, it is nevertheless firmly grounded in international law, especially 
the laws relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights and armed conflict. R2P may 
be considered an expression of a widespread opinio juris, relevant to the creation of an 
international custom; the other element of custom, diuturnitas, that is to say, a general practice, 
however, is still lacking. 
After the resort in Libya, in 2011, of the R2P doctrine, it's wavering over Syria may offer 
several valuable lessons learned which may help facilitate the development of a more realistic 
approach to protecting international human rights: 
160 Nunn F, ' Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890-1940' 64 the 
Hispanic American Historical Review (1984) 166. 
161 Ganguly S, ' India and the Responsibility to Protect' 30 lntemational relations (20 16). 
162 Kuhrt N, ' Russia, the Responsibility to Protect and Intervention' in Fiott D and Koops J The Responsibility to 
Protect and the Third Pillar, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
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1) That states still react differently to violations of humanitarian norms than they do to 
violations of security-related norms: they are much more likely to assume an aggressive 
and possibly interventionist posture when it comes to security norms. 
2) That many states (including Russia and China, permanent UNSC members) are against 
intervention into the territory of sovereign states (which could lead to regime change): 
this is why Russia and China, feeling cheated by the Libya intervention, only approved 
the most narrow disarmament agreement, completely ignoring the underlying 
humanitarian crisis in Syria. 
3) That civilians can still be killed: simply putting a new humanitarian or moral doctrine 
like R2P in place cannot solve the problem of parochial world politics. 
These clearly show that expectations regarding humanitarian intervention need to be 
significantly tempered, but they also point to practical steps that can be taken to help revitalize 
the world's desire and ability to protect human rights. 
Most importantly, the damage caused by the over-zealous Libya intervention must be addressed 
by the adoption of "baby steps". Russia and China willingness to be open to some limited form 
of humanitarian intervention may be achieved once trust is restored and clear mechanisms to 
keep interventions limited and transparent are developed. The UN can help by more clearly 
categorizing various types of global norms. 
Beyond operational and political questions, military intervention involves international law and 
legal issues. As countries like Russia, China and India are particularly worried that it could 
create a precedent for the International Community to have a say in how they treat their own 
minorities, on the other hand, countries like the US are limiting their action to aerial bombing. 
With no ground troops being sent especially after the backlash in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 
consequent heavy death toll, the US now prefer to resort to diplomatic pressure, stressing the 
role of regional actors and neighbours. 
The willingness to use armed forces is also inevitably influenced not only by the desperation 
of the affected population but also by geopolitical factors, including the relevance of the 
country to the world community, regional stability, and the attitudes of other major players. 
It is necessary to prevent umealistic expectations of R2P, rebuilding trust among the great 
powers, and permitting a greater understanding of options for dealing with humanitarian crises: 
there are no silver-bullet solutions to the complex reality of intrastate violence. A response 
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must be tailored to each individual case. Prevention is always the better policy: timing is 
everything and often, the earlier the International Community acts decisively , the better. 
Those who point to a global deadlock between "Western" interventionists and "non-Western" 
stalwarts of sovereignty as a ~ause of lack of progress fail to cope with the real challenges of 
R2P which is both a national and international responsibility. 
To implement R2P is necessary to protect both responsibly (by preventing abuses by great 
powers) and effectively (by developing policy instruments, assessing risks, and identifying the 
least of evils in every particular situation). Responsible policy-making requires all the 
stakeholders to design policies based on evolving knowledge, risk assessment, reflection, and 
learning. 
Many cite the famous Edmund Burke quote "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil 
is for good men to do nothing" . 
For too long the world has stood by in the face of atrocities . R2P urges an end to impunity, 
inaction, and amnesia regarding atrocities, so that there may be fewer moments when the world 
looks back and asks "how could this have happened?" 
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4 C~Jet__1~B_ridgi~_gJJ!~gap between 
SQ..ver:_eignty and R2P .. 
4G 1 Introduction 
As the idea of R2P develops and is debated through legal and moral discussions through the 
last two decades, it is pertinent to go back to the creation of the concept, more specifically the 
primary link it provides between sovereignty and R2P. It also provides another kind of 
example: of the effort given to positive expression in international law to basic standards 
understood historically as universal moral standards. The original rep01i of ICISS described 
the first pillar of R2P as a direct link to sovereignty being the responsibility of a state to protect 
its own. 163 
Human rights considerations introduce so many more variables into the determination of justice 
and place an even heavier burden of deliberation devolving upon international community in 
assessing the lawfulness and rightness of actions. Matters become more complex and uncertain 
than they were in an international system that was composed of a few binary rules applied to a 
handful of States and, particularly, that lacked an international code of human rights. One 
cannot simply condemn externally motivated actions aimed at removing an unpopular 
govenm1ent and permitting the consultation and implementation of the popular Will inherently 
violating sovereignty without analysing whether or not and under what conditions was that 
Will being suppressed, and how the external action will affect the expression and 
implementation of popular sovereignty. 164 The cases no longer belong on a simple checkboard 
of black and white but are transitioning to a complete coverage of grey within the society that 
exists in colour. 
The identification of what is clearly "externally motivated action" is itself an increasingly 
difficult task. No one is entitled to complain that things are getting too complicated. If the 
complexity of decision is the price for increased human dignity on the planet, it is worth it. 
Those who yearn for "the good old days" and continue to trumpet terms like "sovereignty" 
163 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
164 Stacy H, Human Rights for the 21st Centwy: Sovereignty, Civil Society, Culture, Stanford University Press, 
2009. 
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wi·t:hr ut relating them to the human rights conditions within the states under discussion do more 
than committing an anachronism, they undermine human rights. 
Foreign policy attention to child soldiers, children and women as war victims, and child poverty 
represent another element of a shift from "national security" to ·'human security". 
This shift presents a great challenge to national diplomats, nongovernmental organizations and 
the UN to work in partnership. All three sets of actors are being challenged to reinterpret and 
use the UN Charter in pursuit of security for the peoples of the world, if necessary against the 
member governments of the world body. 
Prolonged civil wars and failed states undermine the concept of national security. When rape, 
biological weapons, and children are used as an instrument of war, or when thousands are killed 
by their own security forces, then the concept of national security is immaterial and of zero 
use. 
4.2 Re-defining sovereignty 
This argument has thus raised the question of the true definition of sovereignty and where it 
resides. Upon the understanding of sovereignty, in modern times, and not the pre-modern 
conceptualization of Aristotle, Hart, and Austin, it ought to be noted that the emerging 
definition of sovereignty, as a result of evolving international law, is, in fact, a responsibility 
to those you serve. The concept of democracy, in modern times, has shifted sovereignty from 
the singular and powerful, to the masses who elect and are in control. 165 It continues to be 
defined as not the claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people, 
even by the strongest of supporters, but rather implies a dual responsibility: 166 externally-to 
respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of 
all the people within the state. 167 
The ICISS report on R2P described the breach of sovereignty as the inability to protect the 
citizens of one's State. 168 Yet the serious failures of States to exercise this responsibility in a 
number of cases has left the world at many times in shock, and dismay. Accordingly, the initial 
165 Hobbes T and Gaskin J, Leviathan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. 
166 Wissenburg M, Political Piura/ism and the State: Beyond Sovereignty; Routledge Innovations in Political 
Theory, Routledge, 2008. 
167 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
16 8 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
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linking of sovereignty to state responsibility was followed by the assertion that in cases in 
which a state, for whatever reason, fails to discharge this responsibility "the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." 169 And thus the core of the 
ICISS Report justifies the argument that R2P doesn' t breach sovereignty, as it is the norm that 
comes into action when sovereignty has already been breached by States and then further lays 
out the conditions for military intervention in order to restore sovereignty as well as peace and 
stability. 
In practice this accounts for the idea that sovereignty no longer an excuse to abuse power within 
borders but in fact lies with the responsibility for the good of each state's populace, for positive 
international law is currently understood as the product of formal agreement among states, 
although earlier positive law was understood as reflecting an underlying value consensus, as in 
the evocation of the "interests of humanity" and the "needs of civilization" in the preamble to 
1907 Hague Convention IV. 170 
Hans K.elsen attempted to explain this concept as the idea that sovereign Will of State often 
manifests limits. In one well-reasoned example, K.elsen notes that newly created States enter 
international life with some rights and duties already specified, without the necessity of 
adoption or ratification. 171 
"Just as the individual does not submit [himself] voluntarily to the domestic law of [his} state 
which is binding upon him without and even against his will, a state does not submit voluntarily 
to international law, which is binding upon it whether it does recognize international law or 
does not recognize it. "172 
The concept limits the convenience by which sovereignty may be used as a convenient 
justification for non-intervention by the international community, or as a shield from external 
action by a territorial State. As Richard Falk observes, extra sensitivity to the traditional 
concept of sovereignty provides States within the international community with an effective 
mechanism to avoid the problems associated with the intervention, even where it involves a 
169 ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect Report. 
170 Preamble, Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 539. 
171 Kelsen H, Principles of International law, 2ed, Rhinehart & Company Inc. , New York, 1953 . 
172 Bederman D, the Spirit of International Law, University of Georgia Press, 2002. 
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collapsed government within the subject State. 173 In addition, Anthony Carty perceptively 
notes that sovereignty provides an effective veil for articulating State interests and security 
concerns in a manner that is legally acceptable. He cites the case of the 1990s peace-
enforcement in Bosnia, where States contributing troops argued that forceful action would 
amount tc an intervention, thereby actively undermining the mandate that had been issued by 
the Security Council. 174 
What ICISS called the external dimension of sovereignty is, in fact, the conception of 
sovereignty first defined by Hugo Grotius 175 and operationalized in the Westphalian system. 
So far as other sovereign entities are concerned, it is fundamentally territorial in character, and 
one sovereign entity may not reach across the borders of another to try to influence its internal 
affairs. This leads to both the norm of non-intervention and the conception of such action as 
aggression. There remains a very basic and serious tension between this understanding of 
sovereignty and that defined in terms of internal responsibility, and to simply lay them side by 
side as "dual" responsibilities, does not resolve the inherent tension. The problem expressed in 
this tension is that each of these conceptions of sovereignty serves different fundamental 
values. An ultimate resolution of the tension would involve finding a frame in which these 
different values are reconciled. This is the big difference between the pre-modem idea of 
sovereignty and the definition of sovereignty in terms of the modern day International outlook. 
For the focus of the first was a moral responsibility of the person or persons exercising ruling 
authority. If they ignored or failed in their responsibility for the common good, they were no 
longer, in moral terms, worthy to be called rulers; they became tyrants. While the focus of the 
second shifts the paradigm to the populace and its protection, sovereignty being vested in the 
people and not the land. 
By modern political theory, only the populace of a state can choose its rulers, and this means 
that other states, as individual actors or up to and including the international community as a 
whole, have no right to insert themselves into the matter. How this works out in practice is 
another matter. The pre-modern conception of sovereignty rooted the rights of sovereignty 
173 Falk R, Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World, Taylor & Francis, 2000, 78. 
174 Carty A, ' Sovere ignty in International Law: A Concept of Eternal Return ' in Brace L & Hoffman J (Eds), 
Reclaiming Sovereignty, 1997, at I 0 I, 116. 
17 5 'Grotius, Hugo ', Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy http://www. iep.utm.edu/grotius/ on 15 October 2017. 
so 
elsewhere, and so it made it possible to reach a difTerent judgment on who might or might not 
have the right to exercise ruling authority and to act accordingly. 176 
This is also seen in World Summit Outcome document, 177 which states directly the 
responsibility of each individual state-and thus the governing responsibility- is, in fact, to 
protect its population from the named kinds of harm. So far as the fundamental concern remains 
to protect vulnerable populations from harm these cultural conceptions should be explored and 
their implications examined. 
To have responsibility for the common good of the society governed, as the pre-modern 
conception of sovereignty provided, is quite a broad responsibility. The common good here is 
shorthand for the tlu·ee interlocked ends of political life as they were then conceived: order, 
justice, and peace. In order to serve this, it was not only to implement this in one's own state 
but to look out for the neighbouring states as well. Therefore those in power who faithfully 
discharged their duty and responsibility cannot turn a blind eye to humanity suffering at the 
hands of another next to them. 
4.2.1 Hobbes and sovereign responsibility 
Thomas Hobbes has been known to describe the State ofNature 178 as a 'miserable condition' 
defined by 'continual fear, danger of violent death', 179 he believes that in the absence of a 
'common judge' in the state of nature leads to uncertainty that is indeed dangerous in that 'there 
is no one to decide who is and is not acting in a reasonable fashion' 180 or as he called it 'a 
condition ofWarre of everyone against everyone' 181 . Thus giving us the ideology that although 
everyone is allowed to do as they please in order to survive, we would all fall into anarchy if 
there was no overseeing authority, and the State of Nature will always be a little more than a 
daily battle between individuals to protect the rights that are not recognised by anyone but 
themselves, giving us the primary reason for a civil society, to protect ones ' rights, providing 
176 Lee D, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought Oxford constitutional thea!JI, Oxford 
University Press, 2016 . 
177 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome: Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. 
178 McClelland J, A Hist01y of Western Political Thought, Routledge, 1996. 
179 Gauthier D ' Hobbes on International Relations' , in Gauthier D (Ed) the Logic of Leviathan, Oxford University 
Press, 1969. 
180 Van Mill D, ' Hobbes's Theories of Freedom ' 57, the Journal of Politics (1995) 454. 
181 Hobbes T, 'The Elements of Law Natural and Politic', in Gas tin J (ed) Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, 
Oxford University Press, 1994 at 194. 
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a 'social contract'. Hobbes described this social contract, as an agreement reached between 
individuals in the State ofNature that they would unite in relative harmony and cede the power 
to govern themselves to ' the Leviathan' or higher authority, whom he believes is above the 
contract 182 . Yet, he goes on to say that although they enjoy ' absolute monopoly on the 
legitimate of force' 183 , they ov,re certain responsibilities to the citizens, who by virtue of ceding 
their unlimited freedom, created that very sovereigu. Ergo in Hobbes theory, the social contract 
is void ' if the sovereign threatened the individual with death' or 'could no longer fulfil the 
function for which he or she was given power' 184 . In the Leviathan, Hobbes states that: 185 
'The obligation ofthe subjects to the sovereign lasts just as long, and no longer, than his power 
lasts to protect them. For no covenant can relinquish the right men have by nature to protect 
themselves when no one else can protect them. ' 
When the sovereign could not or cannot fulfil the function for which it was created -
predominantly the protection of its citizens- the sovereign 'is no longer owed obedience, is no 
longer indeed a sovereign' .186 
4.2.2 Locke's theory on state responsibility 
John Locke also speaks of a State ofNature, however, it differs from Hobbes in that, in Locke's 
the State of nature is, in fact, a state of perfect freedom in which power and jurisdiction are 
reciprocal. 187 People are born with subordination or rejection i.e. equal and therefore no one 
can exercise domain over another. The only way to have these rights recognized is for everyone 
to recognizes everyone else rights, thus he states that the reason to enter a civil society is for 
rational people to solve their disputes with the impartial person. 188 He believes that uncertainty 
is the reason behind entering a social contract thus asserting that the 'Sovereign' is not above 
the contract, but part of the society just as everyone else, giving us the theory that the rights 
available to the citizens in the State ofNature are still applicable in a Civil society, which, in 
182 McClelland, a History of Western Political Thought. 
183 Peters R, Hobbes, Penguin Books Ltd, 1967. 
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fact, constrict the sovereign's powers 189 . Thus the people retain the authority to judge the acts 
of their sovereign, and this implies a responsibility on the part of the sovereign to act according 
to the trust placed in it, once again placing the people above the Sovereigns acts. 190 
This assertion is undeniably helpful in terms of reinvigorating the debate smTotmding the R2P, 
given that it does not rely on notions of individual human rights as a challenge to sovereignty, 
but rather attempts to ensure the legitimate exercise of sovereignty by states through its 
emphasis on a state ' s responsibility to protect 'the rights of individual citizens to life, liberty, 
and property' .191 
4.2 .3 Rousseau: States must protect their own. 
Jean- Jacques Rousseau's State of Nature is described as: 192 
Men would have been unequal in strength and cunning in the state of nature, but that would 
not have led some men to dominate others because the motive for that domination would have 
been lacking. Naturally unequal men in the state of nature would simply be unequal men with 
nothing much to quarrel about. It is only in society that inequality matters. 
This resembles a perpetual State of Apathy in which each person lacking the ability to 
communicate, keeps to themselves, in order to survive. He believes that the existence of the 
social contract is for the purpose of furthering one's mental faculties, which replaces man's 
instinct with Justice as a rule of conduct: 
in civil society man[s} ... faculties are so exercised and developed, his mind is so enlarged, his 
sentiments so ennobled, and his whole spirit so elevated that ... he should constantly bless the 
happy hours that lifted him for ever fi'om the state of nature and fi·om a stupid, limited animal 
193 
In the Social contract, Rousseau furthers: 
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"They have exchanged natural interdependence forfi·eedom, the power to injure others for the 
enjoyment of their own security ... Their very lives, which they have pledged to the state are 
always protected by it"194 
In this, Rousseau agrees with Locke, that the sovereign owes it's being to the Social Contract 
and hence it cannot act contrary to it. Thus where a State fails to uphold its own responsibilities 
conferred upon it by the virtue of its social con'tract it undermines its own existence: or as put 
by Rousseau ' to violate the act which has given it existence would be to annihilate itself. 195 
He further insists on this, suggesting that the State retains unlimited power to the extent that it 
legitimately exercises the very same power. Therefore, for a sovereign to legitimately exercise 
its absolute power, it must do so in order to protect the liberty of its citizens and like Hobbes 
and Locke, Rousseau also believed that it is impossible for a sovereign to harm its citizens 
without a Just cause, basing it on the nature of the civil society, once it is untied it acts as a 
whole and hence harming one would harm the whole. 196 A sovereign cannot have interests that 
are contrary to the citizens. 
In this way, Rousseau brings forth that the states possess sovereignty in so far as the state 
protects and advances the interests of the citizens, all of them. 
In the era of new economic , social and political challenges, where globalization is more than 
a mere phrase, the definition of sovereignty seems to flow along a different path from that of 
Kelsen and Aristotle to Rousseau and Locke with the Social Contract theory. It would be more 
appropriate to describe sovereignty as a power given by many to one for their own wellbeing 
and stability of the society. This does not mean that the one has power rather the 'many' have 
it, as they are the ones to place you with that power they can take it away. Although Kelsen 
point on the fact that we enter into the international world with obligations that we have no 
choice but to accept, makes it clear that there exists a clear line of erga omnes. States do not 
live in a vacuum but when looked in the boarder picture, we all live in the same world, with 
imaginary boundaries that cmmot be used to violate the fundamental rights given to all of us 
for the mere reason that we are human. 
194 Merriam C, Histo1y of the Themy of Sovereignty since Rousseau, Batoche Books, 1900. 
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4.3 R2P and sovereignty 
The responsibility to protect concept is actually an endorsement of the principle of sovereignty, 
rather than its opposition.197 The protection of State sovereignty and prohibition of intervention 
\Vi thin the international community has the purpose of safeguarding international stability and 
therefore protecting natural persons from catastrophes. 198 This is due to the fact that 
interventions and imperialist wars may lead to global instability and humanitarian 
catastrophes. 199 The emerging norm is not a justification for forceful intervention in any 
situation, but only in circumstances of stopping or pre-empting genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. 200 The concept only seeks to ensure that the 
protective purpose of sovereignty is maintained by the international community when a State 
is unable or unwilling to provide it. The State is endowed with both international and domestic 
responsibilities by the principle of sovereignty, which includes the duty to protect populations 
within its territory.201 The international community is continually attaching important value to 
the protection of populations from such gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law, 
which are also international crimes.202 In addition, in order to avoid subjectivity and 
unregulated forceful interventions, the concept advocates that such action be maintained within 
the collective security system of the UN, with the Security Council providing authorization.203 
The concept is a mechanism of ensuring that sovereignty serves its purpose, that of protecting 
the citizens of the State, and is not abused to provide a justification for subjecting them to 
avoidable humanitarian catastrophes. 
It will be, in any case, the task of individual states and/or regional organizations to carry out 
any future humanitarian interventions, and this suggests the need for more legal room for such 
197 Kuwali D, the Responsibility to Protect: Implementation of Article 4(h) Intervention, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011 , 97. 
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201 United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 27 June 2011, para. I 0. 
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204 This would also be more in accord with the conception of sovereignty as 
responsibility for the national and international common good, and so far as protection of basic 
human rights is defined as a core responsibility of the goverm11ents of states today, the door is 
opened toward more robust involvement by states and regional organizations in responding to 
depredations by neighbours.205 
In practice, since the end of the cold war, the UN has been intervening more often in conflicts 
within (as opposed to between) States. Sometimes it has happened with, and at times without, 
the consent ofthe governments concerned.206 
In 1999 Tony Blair became one of the first leader to assert a moral right to "get actively 
involved in other people's conflicts"-even without leave from the Security Council-if it was 
the only way to stop dire suffering. Speaking in Chicago after NATO's war over Kosovo, which 
the Security Council had declined to endorse, the former British prime minister made the case 
for "just war, based not on territorial ambitions, but on values" .207 
Political, diplomatic, legal and economic measures should be tried before any resort to anns. 
Not every conflict, potential conflict, or gross abuse of rights should prompt application ofthe 
rule-only the worst cases. And even when all non-military means have failed, armed 
intervention may still not be the right answer. The consequences must be weighed to ensure 
that it will not do more harm than good to the people it seeks to protect.208 
4.4 Conclusion 
The conservative meaning of State sovereignty is related to States' power over their territories, 
governance, law, and citizens. The debate among realist and liberal independence about the 
concept of sovereignty has rescued the concept from something abstract onto something 
practical. State sovereignty, for liberal independence theorists, is defined as State ' s power to 
control activities and populations within their territory, whereas for realists, the very meaning 
204 https://www. un .org/press/en/2013/sc II 087.doc.htm on 20 October 2017. 
205 https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu /cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1174&context=ilr on 20 October 2017. 
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of sovereigr1ty is the State's ability to make authoritative decisions and it necessarily entails 
non-intervention as a logical precondition for the existence of a multiple State system. 
In the context of international relations, the old meaning of sovereignty has changed and State ' s 
borders have become blurred. Globalisation and the rise of international laws and treaties, as 
well as regional organisations, have made the conservative definition of State sovereignty is no 
longer the only definition available. In addition, within the fi·amework of international law, the 
doctrine of sovereignty cannot be separated from the relationship between the sovereignty of a 
State and the sovereignty of peoples. Therefore, the ability of people to exercise their 
sovereignty - such as basic human rights -within a State is crucial. 
Moreover, when it comes to R2P, State sovereignty has completely different meaning. Instead 
of being a virtue, sovereignty becomes a responsibility of a State to protect their people. ICISS 
argues that re-characterisation of sovereignty as a control to sovereignty as responsibility is 
needed in both internal and external duties. The UN defines sovereignty as a charge of 
responsibility that holds states accountable for the welfare of their people and it's no longer 
exclusively protects states from external interference. Therefore, the duty and responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide and mass atrocities lie first with the State, but the 
international community has a role in preventing genocide and mass atrocities that cannot be 
blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. 
As a concept which ranges from national responsibility and international community assistance 
to the use of military force, R2P should be understood in a comprehensive approach. There are 
view criticisms addressed to the pillar and principles of R2P. Criticism appears as a response 
to narrow understanding and applications of R2P which focus on the use of military force as it 
breaches State sovereignty. The narrow application will lead to the misuse of the concept and 
create uncertainty in the future . The next step that should be considered is to have an agreement 
on how to apply the pillars and principles in a very complex crisis including the possibility to 
reform the structure and governance within the UN Security Council to engage UN member 
states in a more inclusive way. 
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5 C!!.w~ Conclusions and Rec<nnmendation 
For the paradigm of Responsibility to protect to work, it is pertinent that it upholds its pillars. 
The concept of R2P is based on a tripod of its pillars, without the implementation of all tlu·ee 
pillars, the concept shall 'fall' and is useless. Be it the P' pillar of responsibility of protection 
of a States own or the 3rd pillar, where we must take to take appropriate coliective action, in 
that not leave them in a worse of state. If we further look at R2P, the concept is not the force 
of violence or military action, it is the embracement of the globalization of the protection of 
humanity. The idea is not only to intervene and take away the disturbance to the peace and 
sanctity but to also rebuild and stabilize the environment of the State in order for the people to 
be given a chance to exercise their rights and sovereignty in full. 
A basic principle of international law, states that States may limit their sovereignty tlu·ough 
treaties. The African States have done so in the Constitutive Act of the AU,209 they collectively 
have decided that sovereignty should no longer trump human rights should the latter be abused 
by the governments whose basic obligation it is to protect them. They have consequently 
conferred a right of intervention on their regional organization in respect of grave 
circumstances specified in the AU Constitutive Act. It must be recognized that the 
incorporation of the principle in the basic law of the AU constitutes a pioneering act in 
international law. A right to intervene in cases of grave circumstances regarding human rights 
violations now exists in Africa. 
This right also represents a paradigm shift in enforcement action by regional organizations 
under the UN Charter.210 The African Union no longer needs to seek a determination by the 
UN Security Council that a humanitarian crisis in an African State constitutes a tlu·eat to the 
peace or a breach of the peace, although it still requires a formal endorsement and support from 
the Security Council. The AU itself recognizes the need for such endorsement not only to 
respect the law of the Charter and further endorses a change within the Security Council in 
order to prevent violations of the Charter. 
Consensual intervention, based on the sovereign right of the territorial State to invite or consent 
to intervention, is inadequate or inappropriate where the government is the perpetrator of the 
atrocities, or fails to grant the consent. 
209 Article 4 (h), Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
21° Chapter Vlll , Charter of the UN. 
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This being said, until States do not begin to see the evolution of sovereignty instead of the 
traditional territorial concept, it can be hard to address whether or not R2P is, in fact, a failed 
dream or a norm for a better future for human dignity and humanity as a whole. 
The African Union has demonstrated the capacity to implement some of the responsibility to 
protect concepts in some situations where peaceful negotiations or consensual interventions are 
adequate, like the case of Kenya and Burundi. However, it has also failed in situations where 
timely and decisive forceful intervention is necessary and may be the only viable option to 
protect civilians, like in the Darfur and Libyan conflicts. In the case of Libya, the AU expressly 
opposed any form of military intervention. Therefore, despite the AU's right of forcible 
intervention to stop genocide and crimes against humanity within its legal framework, 
traditional concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention continue to prevail within the Union's 
subsequent practice. 
This does not take away from the situation that has been created in Libya where with the 
intervention through a military action by NATO left them without the presence of a stable 
government and without the concept of rebuilding and stabilization of the State has left Libya 
in a worse of state, then it was under the reign of Gaddafi. This is similar to the situation of 
Iraq, and what might become of Syria if the world does not intervene and stop the atrocities as 
well as stabilize and assist it in that, provide a stable government that can help rebuild the 
country. Without this, the only result of the military intervention will be what can only be called 
a shadow of a country, with the shambles of buildings and bodies littering the streets and the 
final goal ofR2P being the protection of humanity and human lives failing immensely. This is 
seen in Libya, which has become a State enthralled in slavery almost 7 decades after the 
UDHR211 came into effect and more than a century since the largest practice of slavery was 
eradicated212 (USA 13th amendment ofthe constitution). 
The changes in international diplomacy would offer new opportunities to move beyond the 
nationalism ofthe past century, to a new century of peace based on the welfare of people and 
not States. 
In short, while the responsibility to protect now has been given legal formulation, there remain 
questions as to whether this formulation is the best that can be reached. In considering this 
question and how possibly to move toward a more adequate one, the implications of the pre-
211 Article 4, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I 0 December 1948, 217 A (III) . 
212 13'" Amendment, United States of America Constitution, 17 September 1787, USA-0 I 0. 
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modern idea of sovereignty as responsibility for the common good provides an impmiant 
perspective that is lacking in the conception of sovereignty now generaliy accepted. 
As it states right now R2P is focused on mass atrocious crimes, but it is important to note, that 
these are not the only reasons thousands of lives are taken away, 
"It would only take half an hour for the French boats and French helicopters to reach the 
disaster area. "213 
This was the plea Bernard Kouchner, France's foreign minister, made as his country's diplomats 
at the UN vainly argued that aid might have to be "imposed" on Myam11ar if the military regime 
refused to co-operate, in its time of need when the North Indian cyclone hit in 2003 and 2009.2 14 
If applied correctly, wars and conflicts will not be the only reason to activate the concept, 
famine , natural disasters, viral outbreaks and many other crises would be easily manageable as 
well as humans lives protected. If govenunents begin to see R2P as not a breach of sovereignty 
but rather a helping hand to the people there swore to protect in the time of dire need, many 
civilizations would not be lost and countries will no longer stand on rubble rather than 
prosperity and livelihood. This can further be achieved on the basis of the general assembly 
taking over the issuing of R2P and with the allowance of regional blocks to administer the 
timely response it may achieve a greater and faster solution then waiting on the Security 
Council. Other complications such as over congestion of refugees and internally displaced 
persons, as well as the extinction of cultures, would cease to exist. 
It seems clear that the privileges enjoyed by sovereign States, including non-intervention, are 
contingent upon the state exercising responsible sovereignty. The R2P doctrine provides the 
clearest description of what States need to do in order to exercise their sovereignty responsibly, 
and what can and must be done by the international community when States can or will not 
fulfil their responsibilities. 
If the international community is to learn from its past and have in place the mechanisms 
necessary to legitimately and effectively respond to gross and systematic violations of human 
rights that offend every precept of our common humanity, the R2P must be implemented, and 
sovereignty and non-intervention can no longer be relied upon to excuse mass atrocities. 
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